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Article
Fosterv. Chatman: A Missed Opportunity for Batson
and the Peremptory Challenge
NANCY S. MARDER
In 2016, the UnitedStates Supreme Court decided that the prosecutors

in Foster v. Chatman exercised race-based peremptory challenges in
violation of Batson v. Kentucky. The Court reached the right result, but
missed an important opportunity. The Courtshould have acknowledged that
after thirty years of the Batson experiment, it is clear that Batson is unable
to stop discriminatoryperemptory challenges. Batson is easy to evade, so
discriminatoryperemptory challengespersistand the harmsfrom them are
significant. The Court could try to strengthen Batson in an effort to make it
more effective, but in the end the only way to eliminate discriminatory
peremptory challenges is to eliminate the peremptory challenge.
The Court in Foster undertook a close reading of the prosecutors'
reasons and found race to be the basis for the prosecutors'peremptory

challenges. This Article identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the
Court's opinion in Foster. However, Foster'scase was unusual because the
prosecutors' notes, with their explicit references to African-American

prospective jurors' race, were in effect a "smoking gun." Without such
notes, the prosecutors' seemingly race-neutral explanations would have
sufficed under Batson. The Court needs to recognize the ineffectiveness of
Batson. It could tweak the Batson test in different ways, such as by giving
more weight to discriminatoryeffects or practicesor by devising a stronger
remedy. In the end, however, the only remedy that is adequate to the task is
the one that Justice Marshallproposed in his Batson concurrence thirty
years ago: elimination of the peremptory challenge.
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Fosterv. Chatman: A Missed Opportunity for Batson
and the Peremptory Challenge
NANCY S. MARDER
INTRODUCTION

In 2016, the United States Supreme Court decided Fosterv. Chatman,'
a capital case in which the Court concluded that prosecutors had exercised
race-based peremptory challenges in violation of Batson v. Kentucky.2 Based
on the evidence, the Court reached the correct result in Foster, but it missed
an opportunity to reassess whether Batson, a thirty-year old opinion, is up to
the task it is supposed to perform. Batson was a compromise opinion meant
to preserve the peremptory challenge but to eliminate peremptory challenges
based on race. Batson, with its three-part test,3 was meant to provide trial
judges with a framework so that prosecutors had to give reasons for some,
but not all, of their peremptory challenges. In the years that followed, the
Court extended Batson so that it now applies in both criminal and civil
cases,4 to prosecutors and defense attorneys, and to peremptory challenges
7
exercised on the basis of race, ethnicity,6 or gender.
After thirty years of the Batson experiment, it is time for the Court to

* Professor of Law and Director of the Justice John Paul Stevens Jury Center, 11T Chicago-Kent
College of Law. I thank Denny Curtis, Jeremy Eden, Adam Liptak, Judith Resnik, and Anna Roberts for
helpful conversations about this case, as well as panel participants at the ABA Criminal Justice Section
Roundtable, the Association for the Study of Law, Culture, and Humanities Annual Meeting, the Midwest
Law & Society Retreat, and the Law & Society Association Annual Meeting for their comments on an
early draft of this paper. I also thank Christina Gray for her research assistance and Scott Vanderlin and
Clare Willis for their library assistance.
' 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016). The Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Foster was filed on January 30,
2015. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (No. 14-8349). The Supreme
Court granted the petition on May 26, 2015. See Foster v. Humphrey, 135 S. Ct. 2349 (2015). The Court
heard oral argument on November 2, 2015, and it issued an opinion on May 23, 2016. Foster, 136 S. Ct.
at 1737.
2 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3 See infra Section II, notes I11-16 and accompanying text.
4 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (applying the test to prosecutors in criminal cases); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (extending Batson to civil cases).
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (holding that Batson applied to defense attorneys
when they exercised their peremptory challenges during jury selection).
6 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (extending Batson to race and ethnicity, regardless of
the race or ethnicity of the defendant).
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (holding that gender-based peremptory
challenges violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
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reassess Batson, and its progeny,' and to recognize that Batson has failed to
eliminate discriminatory peremptory challenges. There is extensive
academic literature that is critical of Batson and delineates how easy it is to
evade.9 Batson was a noble effort to maintain the peremptory challenge and
to eliminate discrimination during jury selection, but discriminatory
peremptory challenges endure. If the Court is truly committed to
nondiscrimination during jury selection, as the Equal Protection Clause
requires, it needs to reexamine Batson. There are a number of approaches it
can take to strengthen Batson, but each has shortcomings. In the end, the
Court will need to abandon Batson and eliminate the peremptory challenge.
Foster, the most recent Batson challenge before the Supreme Court, is a
good illustration of the ways in which Batson has failed to deliver on its
promise. Petitioner Timothy Tyrone Foster, an African-American man who
has been on death row for the past thirty years in Georgia, claimed that the
prosecutors violated Batson by using peremptory challenges to strike four
African-American prospective jurors during jury selection.'o Foster was
tried, convicted, and sentenced to death by an all-white jury."
Foster's case provides an unusual window into the exercise of
peremptory challenges and how prosecutors have managed to circumvent
the proscriptions of Batson. Foster objected to the prosecutors' four
peremptories; the prosecutors gave seemingly race-neutral reasons for the
peremptories; and the trial judge and reviewing courts agreed.1 2 However,
Foster was able to obtain the prosecutors' notes years later through the

' See supra notes 4-7 (identifying the Batson progeny). I do not include Hernandez v. New York,

500 U.S. 352 (1991), among the Batson progeny. In Hernandez, the prosecutor exercised peremptories
to remove Latinos from the jury and explained that these prospective jurors had hesitated before agreeing
to accept the interpreter's translation instead of their own understanding of the Spanish language.
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 355-57. Thus, the case turned primarily on their body language in the courtroom
and did not establish any extension of Batson.

' For a sampling of recent academic articles critical of Batson, see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson
from the Very Bottom of the Well: CriticalRace Theory and the Supreme Court'sPeremptory Challenge

&

Jurisprudence,12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 88-90 (2014); Nancy S. Marder, Batson Revisited, 97 IOWA
L. REV. 1585, 1586 (2012) [hereinafter Marder, Batson Revisited|;Nancy S. Marder, JusticeStevens, the
Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1683, 1684 (2006); Barbara O'Brien
Catherine M. Grosso, Beyond Batson's Scrutiny: A Preliminary Look at Racial Disparities in
ProsecutorialPeremptoryStrikes Following the Passageof the North CarolinaRacialJustice Act, 46

U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1623, 1628 (2013); Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping
and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 159-61 (2005); Tania Tetlow, Solving Batson, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1859, 1864-65 (2015). For an extensive collection of early articles critical of
Batson, see People v. Boiling, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1144-45 (N.Y. 1992) (Bellacosa, J., concurring)
(providing citations).
10 Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1742.
11 Ida
12 Id. at

1743.
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Georgia Open Records Act.13 The notes revealed that the prosecutors were
working from a venire list that was color-coded by race, juror cards that
indicated race, and a list of "definite NO's" that included all the AfricanAmerican prospective jurors. 14 The notes revealed that the prosecutors in
Foster's case were taking race into account at every step of jury selection,
contrary to the commands of Batson." The prosecutors' notes revealed the
disjuncture between the proffered reasons and the motivating reasons.1 6
Foster claimed that the prosecutors exercised race-based peremptory
challenges to remove the four remaining African-American prospective
jurors on his venire." Typically, this would be a fact-based inquiry that
would not lead the Supreme Court to grant the petition for writ of certiorari,
much less to exercise plenary review. In Foster, however, the Court
granted the writ of certiorari and decided the case after briefs on the merits
and oral argument, perhaps because this Batson challenge included a
"smoking gun." The prosecutors' notes made this a hard case to ignore. If
the Court failed to find a Batson violation in a case like this, then Batson
would have been bereft of any meaning at all. The only way to establish a
Batson violation would have been if the prosecutor had said outright that he
exercised his peremptories based on race. Few prosecutors would make such
a rookie mistake.
Foster only asked the Court to consider his Batson claim and to find a
Batson violation in his case, and this is all the Court did. The Court could
have used Foster to reexamine Batson and the role of the peremptory
challenge, even without being asked to do so by the petitioner, just as it once
used Batsonl9 to reassess the evidentiary standard required by Swain v.

" Id. at 1743-45; see GA. CODE ANN.

§§

50-18-70 to 50-18-77 (2002) (providing details on the

purposes, procedures, and enforcement mechanisms of Georgia's open records laws).
14

Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1744-45.

"s Id. at 1755.
16 Id.
17

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supranote 1, at 9-10, Foster, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (No. 14-8349).

" Although the Court does not usually engage in error correction, in some instances it will do so in
order to clarify the law for the lower courts. In such cases, a more likely response would be for the Court
to decide the case summarily and without oral argument, and to issue a per curiam opinion. See, e.g.,

Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 766 (1995) (per curiam).
1
The question presented in Batson was whether the petitioner was tried "in violation of
constitutional provisions guaranteeing the defendant an impartial jury and a jury composed of persons
representing a fair cross section of the community." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 112 (1986)

(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari i). Although the petitioner did not ask
the Court to address Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), the Court did address it. The Batson Court
rejected Swain's "crippling burden of proof," Batson, 476 U.S. at 92, which required a defendant to show
that a prosecutor had exercised race-based peremptories in case after case, rather than in the defendant's
case alone. See id at 93 ("For reasons that follow, we reject the evidentiary formulation as inconsistent
with standards that have been developed since Swain for assessing a prima facie case under the Equal

Protection Clause."); id. at 100 (White, J., concurring) ("The Court overturns the principal holding in
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 22 (1965).").
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Alabama,2 0 without explicitly being asked to do so. Instead, the Court issued
a fact-bound opinion in Foster. The opinion does serve as a model to
appellate courts of the kind of close reading that they can undertake in
assessing a prosecutor's ostensibly race-neutral reasons. However, appellate
courts tend to defer to trial judges' determinations in Batson challenges as
the Batson Court had advised, 2' and the Foster Court did not instruct
otherwise. Moreover, even the kind of close reading that the Court undertook
in Foster depends on circumstances that are not present in every Batson
challenge case, such as inconsistencies between the reasons the prosecutor
gave for striking black jurors and the prosecutor's failure to strike white
jurors with that same characteristic.
Although the Court missed an opportunity with Foster, there will be
other Batson challenges and other opportunities. The Court needs to take one
of these opportunities to try to make the Batson test more effective or to
conclude that Batson is beyond repair. If the Court tweaks the Batson test, it
can try to give the defendant a variety of ways of establishing discriminatory
intent, which is a difficult showing for a defendant to make. It could do this
by permitting the defendant to infer discriminatory intent from a
"discriminatory effect" or a "discriminatory practice." Alternatively, it could
add teeth to the remedy for a Batson violation, as North Carolina did in its
short-lived Racial Justice Act of 2009.22 North Carolina passed a statute that
said if prosecutors exercised peremptories based on race in a capital case,
the remedy would be a sentence of life in prison rather than death. In other
words, North Carolina's statute took death off the table in an effort to get
prosecutors to stop exercising peremptories based on race. 23 Finally, the
Court could acknowledge that peremptory challenges continue to permit
discrimination during jury selection and it could eliminate peremptory
challenges. Although this last approach seems to be the most radical, in fact,
it has roots that extend back to Batson. Justice Thurgood Marshall identified
this remedy thirty years ago in his concurrence in Batson.24
This Article proceeds in five sections. Section I sets the stage and
20 Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24 (holding that discriminatory peremptories would violate the Equal

Protection Clause, but the defendant had to show that the prosecutor had engaged in race-based
peremptories in case after case, not just in the defendant's case).
21

See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 ("Since the trial judge's findings in the context under

consideration here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give

those findings great deference.").
22 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws § 15A-201 1(b)(2) (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A2011 (b)(2)(2012)) (repealed 2013).
23 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2012(a)(3) (repealed 2013).
24 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("I applaud the Court's holding that the
racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the Equal Protection Clause, and I join the

Court's opinion. However, only by banning peremptories entirely can such discrimination be ended.").
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explains Foster's Batson challenge, including its smoking gun-the
prosecutors' notes. Section II examines the Court's opinion in Foster.
Petitioner Foster asked the Court to answer a narrow question-whether
prosecutors exercised their peremptories in violation of Batson-andthat is
all the Court did. Section II examines the Court's opinion on its own terms,
as a narrow application of Batson. The Court's opinion benefits Foster, but
also serves as a model for how lower courts, particularly appellate courts,
could do a careful reading of a prosecutor's reasons. The Court's opinion in
25
Fosteralso builds on what the Court did in Snyder v. Louisiana, Miller-El
27
v. Dretke,2 6 and Miller-El v. Cockrell. In the end, however, the Court's
close and careful reading of the prosecutors' reasons in Foster is limited to
certain kinds of cases, and will not be of much aid to run-of-the-mill Batson
challenges. Although the Court's approach in Foster is limited in scope, at
least it shows that the Supreme Court is serious about uncovering Batson
violations when the violation is made apparent, as it was in this case through
the prosecutors' notes.
The Court's approach in Foster, described in Section II, resolves the
case, but does not help rid jury selection of discriminatory peremptory
challenges. With thirty years of Batson experience, more is needed to
accomplish the goal that Batson was supposed to achieve. Section III
identifies several ways that the Court could tweak the Batson test to make it
stronger. For example, the Court could build on Miller-El v. Cockrell and
infer discriminatory intent from discriminatory effects or discriminatory
practices, which would be easier to show than outright purposeful
discrimination. Section IV looks to state experimentation to see how a
stronger remedy for a Batson violation could give Batson more bite.
In the end, however, the alternatives suggested in Sections III and TV are
fraught with difficulties and do not offer a panacea to the problems that
plague Batson and the peremptory challenge. Thus, Section V harkens back
to Justice Marshall's approach and provides the only remedy that is adequate
to the task. Section V recommends the elimination of peremptory challenges
on the ground that they continue to permit discrimination in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. A growing number of trial court judges, who are
in the trenches and responsible for implementing Batson, have come to share
Justice Marshall's view that peremptories should be eliminated. The harms
that peremptories cause defendants, prospective jurors, and communities are
significant. Thirty years of experimentation with Batson suggest that it is
time-well past time-for the Court to reexamine Batson and the
peremptory challenge.

552 U.S. 472 (2008).
545 U.S. 231 (2005).
27 537 U.S. 322 (2003).
25

26
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I. SETTING THE STAGE

A. Background ofFoster's Batson Challenge
The petitioner, Timothy Tyrone Foster, an African-American man of
limited mental ability, has been on death row since 1987, for the rape and
murder of an elderly white woman.2 8 At trial, on direct appeal, in his state
habeas petition, and in his petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, Foster
challenged the prosecutors' exercise of four peremptory challenges. 29 The
venire of ninety-five prospective jurors had initially included ten AfricanAmericans. 30 After the exercise of hardship excuses and for cause challenges
in this death penalty case, four African-Americans remained: three women
and one man.'
The two prosecutors3 2 exercised peremptory challenges against all four
remaining African-American prospective jurors. Foster raised a Batson
challenge after the four were struck from the venire. During the Batson
hearing that followed, Stephen Lanier, the lead prosecutor, explained that he
looked at several factors in deciding whether to exercise a peremptory
challenge. He told the court:
In this case, we have a death penalty, and I want to state for
the record that when I look at a death penalty, I look for more
reasons than race. Race is not a factor. Age of the person is a
factor of the witness - of the juror. The gender, female or male,
the religious preference is something I always look at. When I
strike a jur[or], I look at those combinations.33
He pointed out that his general approach in capital cases was to strike women
because women were less likely than men to impose the death penalty.34
28

Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1743.
29 However, during the hearing on Foster's Motion for New Trial, petitioner's lawyer at the time,
Mr. James C. Wyatt, 111, conceded that be would no longer challenge the prosecution's peremptory
against Evelyn Hardge. See Transcript of Hearing on Motion for New Trial (Nov. 24, 1987), in I Joint
App. at 69, 106, Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016) (No. 14-8349) ("I'll concede Evelyn
Hardge.") (quoting James Wyatt, Esq.); see also id. at 125 ("Your Honor, and for the record [Wyatt]
conceded that striking Evelyn Hardge was not a factor-he conceded on the record that he was not
contesting the striking of Mrs. Hardge.") (quoting Prosecutor Stephen F. Lanier).
o Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, Foster, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (No.14-8349).
31 Id. at 6.
32 The two prosecutors were Stephen F. Lanier (lead prosecutor) and Douglas Pullen (an assistant
prosecutor who eventually became a trial court judge).
3 Transcript of Argument on Objection Pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, in I Joint App. at 41,
Foster, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (No. 14-8349) [hereinafter Batson Hearing Transcript].
" Id. at 42. Foster's trial took place in 1987, which was seven years before the Court held that
gender-based peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994). At the hearing on Foster's motion for a new trial, Prosecutor Lanier
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Prosecutor Lanier gave individual explanations for each of the four
African-American prospective jurors whom he had removed from the
venire. All of the prospective jurors had completed a five-page questionnaire
and the parties had the opportunity to question each prospective juror
individually for about thirty minutes. The lawyers had a weekend to consider
their strikes. In this death penalty case, the defense had twenty peremptories
and the prosecution had ten."
Prosecutor Lanier explained during the Batson hearing that followed the
exercise of his peremptories that he struck the one African-American man,
Eddie Hood, mainly because he had a son who was near the age of the
defendant, and the son had a prior conviction.36 Hood also had a wife who
worked at a hospital that treats mentally ill patients and the defendant was
going to raise a claim about limited mental capacity.37 The prosecutor noted
that Hood had asked to be removed from the jury because of other
commitments and that he had recently been hospitalized with food poisoning
and it was unclear whether he would have medical reasons that would
interfere with his capacity to serve.38 The prosecutor added that Hood was
slow to respond to questions, especially questions pertaining to the death
penalty." Finally, the prosecutor mentioned Hood's religious affiliation
(Church of Christ) and how that might affect his view of the death penalty
and the fact that his brother "counsels people in drugs," and that the
defendant would be raising drugs as a "primary defense" in this case.4 0
After the prosecutor had given all of his reasons for dismissing Eddie
Hood, the trial judge denied the defendant's Batson challenge and was
prepared to proceed, but the prosecutor wanted to explain why he had struck
the three African-American women; he wanted to "perfect the record." 4 1 The
prosecutor presciently recognized that "five or ten years down the line I need
to give a neutral explanation, and I have my explanations . . and I want the
Court to know my reasons for it." 42 He explained that he was striking
prospective jurors with an eye to the death penalty phase: "So my whole
objective in striking eighty percent women and two men were their views on
reiterated that his approach to death penalty cases was to strike female prospective jurors. See Batson
Hearing Transcript, supra note 33, at 42 ("Women have a tendency in a case of this nature where the
death penalty is being sought-they have serious reservations, time conflicts or whatever it may be, but
that is what I look at when I am trying a death penalty case . . . .") (quoting Prosecutor Lanier).
3 Transcript of Hearing on Motion for New Trial, supranote 29, at 103 ("[T]he defense has twenty
[peremptories], and we have ten. . . .") (quoting Prosecutor Lanier).
" Batson Hearing Transcript, supranote 33, at 44. Eddie Hood's son was eighteen at the time and

Foster was nineteen. Id
37 Id. at 45.

Id. at 45-46.
Id. at 46.
4 Id.
41 Id. at 49.
42 Id
3

39
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death penalty and their relationship to their environment and the defendant.
That is my whole purpose, certainly race neutral." 43
As to the three African-American women, the prosecutor gave multiple
reasons for each strike. He said that he had removed Marilyn Garrett because
she looked "at the ground" when answering questions; her answers were
"very short"; she was involved with Head Start, which "deals with low
income, underprivileged children"; and her age was "so close" to that of the
defendant." He had removed Mary Turner because she had not been candid
on one question on the questionnaire; she appeared "hostile to the Court and
counsel"; and she did not make eye contact with the prosecution, but did
with the defendant. 45 The prosecutor explained that he had removed Evelyn
Hardge because she had talked to the defendant's mother before she entered
the courtroom; she had answered some of the questions on the questionnaire
incorrectly; and she "appeared confused, very easily swayed, irrational,
bewildered, incoherent." 46 The trial judge upheld all of the strikes and found
no Batson violation.47
After his conviction and death sentence, Foster made a motion for postjudgment discovery, in which he sought the prosecution's notes from jury
selection. 48 Foster requested that the court conduct an in camera review of
the notes and records and keep them so that they could be available for
appellate review; however, the court denied this motion.49
Foster also renewed his Batson challenge in a motion for a new trial"o
and the court held extensive hearings on this motion on November 24,
1987."' The defense attorney sought to put the prosecutor on the stand and
cross-examine him as to his motives for his strikes.52 Although there seemed
to be no authority for this procedure, the prosecutor agreed to take the stand
and to answer questions in order to have the opportunity, on direct
examination of the other prosecutor, to perfect the record and to make it
unnecessary for the defense to have access to the prosecution's notes."
43 Id. at 57.
4Id.

at 55-56. The Petitioner's Brief argues that Marilyn Garrett was thirty-four, whereas Timothy

Foster was nineteen at the time of trial. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 30, at 8.
4 Batson Hearing Transcript, supra note 33, at 52-53.

Id. at 49-51.
Id. at 58 ("Well, the Court is satisfied that Batson has been satisfied. The motion is overruled.")
(quoting Judge John A. Frazier, Jr., Superior Court, Floyd County, Rome, Georgia).
41 Motion for Post-Judgment Discovery, in I Joint App. at 61, 63, Foster v. Chatnan, 136 S. Ct.
1737 (2016) (No. 14-8349).
41 Order on Motion for Post-Judgment Discovery, in I Joint App. at 66, Foster, 136 S. Ct. 1737
(No. 14-8349).
50 Transcript of Hearing on Motion for New Trial, supranote 29, at 69.
sId.
at 69-126.
52
4
4

Id. at 75.

s Id. at 78-79.
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In the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the questioning of the
prosecutors focused on the particular African-American prospective jurors
whom they had removed with peremptory challenges. For example,
Prosecutor Douglas Pullen explained that they had removed Marilyn Garrett
because of her demeanor.5 4 He said that they had focused on the fact that she
was a "social worker" who "worked at Head Start."" He also reiterated the
point made by Prosecutor Lanier at the Batson hearing: "[Y]ou cannot
separate one factor from another. We're judging a total human being up
there, religion, their answers, their attitudes, the whole shooting match.""
This hearing allowed the prosecutors to reiterate the main reasons that they
had exercised strikes against the four African-American prospective jurors,
as well as to add background information as to each of the prospective jurors
that had not been introduced at the earlier Batson hearing.
The hearing on a motion for a new trial also gave the trial judge a chance
to hear all the reasons in great detail," to be updated on what other judges
8
in other courts had found to be neutral reasons,5 and to issue his own very
lengthy and detailed opinion on the Batson challenge in this case, in which
he denied the motion for a new trial.59 Judge Frazier considered each of the
African-American prospective jurors, except for Evelyn Hardge, who was
no longer being challenged by the defense, and found the prosecutors'
60
reasons to be race neutral and legitimate. The judge acknowledged that
some reasons seemed like they would be unlikely predictors of a juror's
behavior, such as Mary Turner's employment at Northwest Georgia
Regional Hospital, but he found other reasons more persuasive, such as her
He was also
inaccurate response to a question on the questionnaire.
persuaded by body language and demeanor, and in particular, the
prosecutors' claim that Mary Turner had not made eye contact with them. 62
Interestingly, though, the judge did not indicate that he had noted this lack
of eye contact during the voir dire.
54

Id. at 93-94.

"Id at 95. Although the prosecutors had claimed that Garrett's work at Head Start was their main
justification for their strike when they explained it during the Batson hearing, they had not mentioned
that she was a social worker. In fact, she was not a social worker; rather, she was a teacher's aide, as the
petitioner points out in his brief to the Court. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 30, at 8. The hearing on a
motion for a new trial, which took place on November 24, 1987, seven months after jury selection on
April 20, 1987, shows how errors can be introduced after the fact. Transcript of Hearing on Motion for

New Trial, supra note 29, at 69, 133.
s6 Transcript of Hearing on Motion for New Trial, supranote 29, at 96.

sId at 83-116.
Ild at 117-26.
' Order on Motion for New Trial, in I Joint App. at 131, 144, Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737
(2016) (No. 14-8349).
60 1d. at 133-44.
6i Id at 138-39.
62

Id. at 140-41.
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In the end, the trial judge found the prosecutors' reasons neutral and
reasonable. His conclusion about the prosecution's peremptory against
Marilyn Garrett, namely "that there was no discriminatory intent, and that
there existed reasonably clear, specific, and legitimate reasons for excusal
of this prospective juror,"63 expressed his findings with respect to the
prosecution's peremptories against the other two African-American
prospective jurors as well.' This case then went up on appeal to the Georgia
Supreme Court, which found no error as to the Batson challenge and other
issues, and affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence of death."s
B. The Twist: The Prosecutors'Notes
What distinguished Foster's Batson challenge from myriad other Batson
challenges was that he was ultimately able to obtain the prosecutors' notes
from jury selection as a result of the Georgia Open Records Act,66 even
though he had been denied these notes in a motion for post-judgment
discovery.67 The notes come as close to a "smoking gun" as one is likely to
find in a Batson challenge. The only starker example of a Batson violation
would be if the prosecutor explicitly gave the prospective juror's race as his
reason for exercising his peremptory, but it is unlikely that a prosecutor
today would make that mistake. The excerpted notes, copies of which were
included in Foster's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
Court, Brief for Petitioner, the Joint Appendix, and a few pages of which are
appended to this Article," show that the prosecution's file included the
venire list (of which there are four different copies) with the names of the
black prospective jurors marked with a "B" and highlighted on each copy. 69
In addition, the questionnaires that each prospective juror completed prior
to jury service included a question about the prospective juror's race.70 For
each juror who indicated that his or her race was "black," the race was
circled. 7' The prosecutors also indicated on juror cards the race of several
black prospective jurors with the designation "B#1," "B#2," and "B#3 ."72
Id. at 143.
" id. at 135-41.
6s Foster v. State, 374 S.E.2d 188, 191-92, 197
(Ga. 1988).
6 See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-18-70 to -77 (2002).
67 Motion for Post-Judgment Discovery, supra note 48, at 61, 63; Order on
Motion for PostJudgment Discovery, supra note 49, at 66, 68 ("Having considered the motion and authority cited by
Defendant, the Court denies his request that the Court impanel all notes and records which the State has
concerning jury selection . . . .").
68
See app. A at 1208-11.
63

69

70

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 30, at 15.

d. at 17.
Id. at 16-17.
72 Id. at 17; see also app. A
at 1210.
7'
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The prosecutors' notes also included comparisons among the black jurors.73
For example, a note about Evelyn Hardge indicated: "Might be the [b]est
one to put on [j]ury." 74 A draft affidavit from the prosecution's investigator
noted that "[i]f it comes down to having to pick one of the black jurors,
[Marilyn] Garrett, might be okay." 75 Perhaps most tellingly, the first five
names on the list entitled "definite NO's" included the names of all the
remaining African-American prospective jurors, plus one, Shirley Powell,
who was excused for cause at the last minute. 76 The names are listed as
follows: "(1) Hood, (2) Hardge, (3) Powell, (4) Garrett, (5) Turner, (6)
Grindstaff." 77 "Grindstaff" refers to Bobbie Grindstaff, the only white
prospective juror on the "definite NO's" list, and she, too, was struck by the
prosecution.78
Although Foster presented this newly acquired information as part of his
state habeas petition, the state habeas court denied relief on December 4,
2013.79 With respect to the names of African-American prospective jurors
highlighted in green, the state habeas court noted that the venire lists were
circulated to a number of different people in the prosecutor's office; thus, it
would be difficult to know who added the highlighting.so In addition, the
state habeas court had before it affidavits from the two prosecutors, in which
they had sworn or affirmed that they did not add the highlighting to the
venire lists and that they had not instructed anyone else in their office to do
so." In addition, Prosecutor Pullen, who had since become a state trial judge,
also stated in his affidavit that he did not rely on the highlighted venire lists
in deciding how to exercise his peremptories.82 The state habeas court also
relied on the findings of the trial court and review by the Georgia Supreme
Court on direct appeal and held that Foster's "renewed Batson claim [was]
without merit."83
What is so remarkable about the prosecution's notes in this case is they
" Brief for Petitioner, supra note 30, at 17.
7 Id It is surprising that the prosecution thought that Evelyn Hardge "[m]ight be the [b]est one to
put on [j]ury" when even the defense attorney and judge agreed that she was appropriately struck from
the jury. See Transcript of Hearing on Motion for New Trial, supranote 29, at 106, 125 (including the
defense attorney's concession and the judge's agreement that neither side would have wanted Evelyn

Hardge).
* Brief for Petitioner, supranote 30, at 18.

Id. at 19; see also app. A at 1211.
n Brief for Petitioner, supranote 30, at 19; see also app. A at 1211.
7 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 30, at 19 & n.16.
7 Foster v. State, No. 1989-V-2275 (Ga. Super. Ct. Dec. 4, 2013), in 1 Joint App. at 245, Foster v.
Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016) (No. 14-8349).
8o Id at 193.
' Affs. of Stephen Lanier & Douglas C. Pullen, in I Joint App. at 168-71, Foster, 136 S. Ct. 1737
(No. 14-8349).
82
Id. at 170-71.
13 Order Denying Petitioner's Request for Habeas Relief, in Joint App. at 172, 196, Foster, 136 S.
Ct. 1737 (No. 14-8349).
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reveal that the prosecutors thought about race at every stage of the jury
selection. When the prosecutors received the questionnaires from the
prospective jurors, they (or others in their office)84 circled the race of the
prospective juror if that person was black, but not if that person was white.
Similarly, they (or someone in their office) highlighted in bright green the
names on the venire list of black prospective jurors and later identified black
prospective jurors on their juror cards with a "B" and a number. The
prosecution also considered the black prospective jurors in relation to each
other-in other words, if they had to have one black juror on the jury, which
one were they more inclined to have?
Although these various markings suggest that the prosecutors were well
aware of the race of the prospective jurors, their list of "definite NO's,"
which contained the names of all five black prospective jurors, suggested
that the prosecutors were not just aware of race, but that they held negative
views about having jurors who were of a particular race-black--on the
petit jury in this capital case. Their list of "definite NO's" suggested that
they planned to remove each of the African-American prospective jurors
because of their race in the order suggested by the list. They only needed to
know that those prospective jurors were black to know that they did not want
them on the petit jury. In fact, they did exercise their peremptories against
the four African Americans in the order they appeared on the "definite
NO's" list (after Shirley Powell, listed as #3, had been removed for cause)."
The prosecutors' notes revealed that they used their peremptories to
exclude African-American prospective jurors in precisely the way that
Batson was designed to prevent. Justice Powell, writing for the Batson Court
in 1986, emphasized that the Court had been committed to
nondiscrimination in jury selection for over a century. 6 Since Strauder v.
West Virginia," decided in 1880, the Court had recognized that the Equal
Protection Clause "guarantee[d] the defendant that the State will not exclude
" Whether the two prosecutors or others in the office added the green highlighting to the venire list
should not matter; the markings were the work product of the office. After all, the prosecutors were
unwilling to turn over the venire lists when Foster sought the prosecutors' notes as part of a discovery
request, which suggests that the prosecutors regarded the venire lists, replete with green highlighting, as

part of the work product of their office. Indeed, the trial judge who denied the motion for post-judgment
discovery also viewed the notes as part of the work product ofthe office and that was part of his reasoning

in denying the motion. He explained: "In addition, it is noted that the material sought by the Defendant
to be impaneled is such as would fall under the work product doctrine. The highest court of the land has

declared that this doctrine applies in criminal as well as civil cases." Order on Motion for Post-Judgment
Discovery, supra note 49, at 68.
s Brief for Petitioner, supranote 30, at 18-19.

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986).
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880) (holding that a state statute prohibiting
African-American men from serving on juries violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
16
17

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
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members of his race from the jury venire on account of race . .. or on the
false assumption that members of his race as a group are not qualified to
serve as jurors."" As the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Batson, prospective
jurors were to be selected based on their "individual qualifications" and their
"ability" to "Impartially ... consider evidence presented at a trial."89
C. The Role ofReasons
The prosecution notes suggest that the prosecutors had focused on the
race of the prospective jurors from the moment they had been summoned to
the courtroom; however, when the prosecutors were asked to give reasons
for their peremptories, they had no difficulty providing detailed, specific,
ostensibly race-neutral reasons. 90 They gave reasons that prosecutors often
give for exercising a peremptory. Although this case was tried soon after
Batson was decided, the prosecution gave reasons that have typically been
given and upheld in the thirty years since Batson has been in effect.
The prosecutors in this case were savvy about the reasons they gave,
anticipating reasons that would be viewed as race neutral and acceptable, not
just in their case, but in future cases. In the years since Batson was decided,
prosecutors have said that they are worried about prospective jurors who
share some characteristics with the defendant (such as similar age and
number of children), 9' have a family member who had a past experience with
the criminal justice system, 92 belong to a particular profession, 93 live in a
particular area (near drug dealing or near the defendant), 94 exhibited certain
body language in the courtroom (lack of eye contact, too much eye

8

Batson, 476 U.S. at 86 (citations omitted).

9Id. at 87.
9o See infra text accompanying notes 111-16.
91 See, e.g., United States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 951, 953 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a
prosecutor's reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge against the only African-American woman
on the jury because of her age, number of children, and profession (computer analyst) were race neutral
and not a pretext for racial bias).
92

See, e.g., Murray v. Groose, 106 F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 1997) ("In the instant case, the prosecutor

tendered specific, plausible, race-neutral explanations for his peremptory strikes of seven AfricanAmerican members of the venire [including] ... two because they had relatives who had been charged

with or convicted of crimes .....
9 See, e.g., McMillon, 14 F.3d at 953 (describing reasons for striking a prospective juror, including
her profession as a computer analyst).
" See, e.g., United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388, 393 (3d Cir. 1993) (accepting as "raceneutral on its face" the government's explanation that it exercised a peremptory challenge against an

African-American female juror "because of [her] likely place of residence, she was more likely to have
had direct exposure to a drug trafficking situation than other potential jurors as a class").
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contact),95 wore a particular item of clothing ("dresses like a rock star"),96 or
had a particular hair style ("long hair" or "has a mustache and goatee") that
the prosecutor did not like.97 Typically, the only time these reasons do not
work is when the prosecutor offers one of these reasons for striking a black
prospective juror but allows a white prospective juror with the same feature
to remain on the jury.98
In Foster's case, the prosecutors provided many of these reasons. At the
Batson hearing, they explained that they removed Eddie Hood because he
had a son with a misdemeanor conviction who was about the same age as
the defendant and Hood had been slow to respond to questions especially
about the death penalty.99 They removed Marilyn Garrett because her age
was close to that of the defendant and she worked for Head Start; in addition,
she had appeared nervous and had not asked to be excused from the jury. 0
They removed Mary Turner because of inaccuracies on her questionnaire
and because she had appeared "hostile," "confused," and "hesitant." 0
Finally, they removed Evelyn Hardge because she had appeared "confused"
and "irrational."' 02
The prosecution offered multiple reasons for each of its strikes against
African-American prospective jurors. Foster, in his Supreme Court brief,
noted that the prosecution offered nine reasons for striking Eddie Hood, ten
reasons for removing Marilyn Garrett, twelve reasons for removing Mary
Turner, and nine reasons for removing Evelyn Hardge.' 03 The prosecution
took an "everything but the kitchen sink" approach to providing reasons,
which allowed the trial judge to highlight the reasons that he found most
relevant and to conclude that they were race neutral.
s See, e.g., United States v. Ferguson, No. 92-5571, No. 92-5587, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 22373,
at *9-10 (4th Cir. Sept. 1, 1993) (holding that the prosecutor's reasons for exercising a peremptory
against an African-American juror who "stared" at the prosecutor and who might have difficulty with the
complexities of the case were acceptable reasons).
96 United States v. Clemons, 941 F.2d 321, 322-23, 325 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that aprosecutor's

reason for exercising a peremptory challenge against an African-American man because he dressed "like
a rock star" was race neutral) (internal quotation marks omitted).

9 Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 766 (1995) (per curiam) ("I struck [juror] number twenty-two
because of his long hair. He had long curly hair .... And juror number twenty-four also has a mustache
and goatee type beard. . . . And I don't like the way they looked, with the way the hair is cut, both of
them.") (quoting the prosecutor) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

" See, e.g., United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a
peremptory was discriminatory when the prosecutor said that he struck a Latino prospective juror because
he was from a certain city but did not strike a white prospective juror from that same city). For a more
extensive discussion of this point, see infra Section I.B.3.

' See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text (indicating the reasons to strike Hood).
"o See supranote 44 and accompanying
.o. See supranote 45 and accompanying
1 See supranote 46 and accompanying
'0 Brief for Petitioner, supranote 30, at

text (indicating the reasons to strike Garrett).
text (indicating the reasons to strike Turner).
text (indicating the reasons to strike Hardge).
7-10.
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Although the two prosecutors gave many reasons each time they
removed an African-American prospective juror from the jury, the one
reason they were careful not to give was race.'" They had to avoid
mentioning race in order to avoid a Batson violation. At the time of Batson,
prosecutors could give any seemingly race-neutral reason as long as it was
"related to the particular case to be tried."'o They could even admit, as the
prosecutors did in this case, that they exercised peremptories to exclude
women because gender-based peremptories had not yet been prohibited. 06
They could admit to using gender, but they could not admit to using race as
the basis for a peremptory challenge. As Prosecutor Lanier explained on the
stand: "All I have to do is have a race neutral reason, and all of these reasons
that I have given the Court are racially neutral." 107
Although the prosecution's reasons seemed race neutral, their notes
revealed otherwise. Their notes showed that they focused on the race of each
prospective juror at every stage of the jury selection. Their notes also showed
that their goal was to remove all of the African-American prospective
jurors-all of whom appeared on their "definite NO's" list. They gave other
reasons to justify their strike, but the underlying reason was the race of the
prospective juror. What distinguishes this case from most other Batson
challenge cases is that there were notes that revealed the prosecutors' actual
reason for their peremptory challenges and which undercut the ostensible
reasons that the prosecutors offered to the trial judge and the defendant.
II. EVALUATING FOSTER WITHIN

THE NARROW CONFINES OF BATSON

In Foster, the Supreme Court carefully examined the prosecutors'
reasons in a case involving a Batson violation. Petitioner Foster had asked
the Court simply to decide whether the courts below had failed to recognize
a Batson violation.' The Court's answer, after a close reading of the record,
was "yes."' 0 Working within the framework provided by Batson and
reinforced by Snyder v. Louisiana and Miller-El v. Cockrell, the Supreme
Court held in Fosterthat the prosecution exercised two peremptories based
"o'See Batson Hearing Transcript, supranote 33, at 41 ("In this case, we have a death penalty, and
I want to state for the record that when I look at a death penalty, I look for more reasons than race. Race
is not a factor.") (quoting Prosecutor Lanier).
io5

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,98 (1986). After Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768-69 (1995),

the reason does not have to be related to the case. It can be "silly or superstitious," id. at 768, just as long
as it is not based on race or gender. See id. at 769 (explaining that the prosecutor does not have to give a
reason "that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection").
16
See supranote 34 (discussing when gender-based peremptories became a violation of the Equal

Protection Clause).
1

owBatson Hearing Transcript, supranote 33, at 48.
o Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at 1.

o See Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1755 (2016) ("[P]rosecutors were motivated in
substantial part by race when they struck Garrett and Hood from the jury 30 years ago. Two peremptory
strikes on the basis of race are two more than the Constitution allows.").
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on race, and therefore, it had violated Batson.'I The Court could have used
Fosterto make the Batson test more effective, or to acknowledge that Batson
was ineffective and beyond repair, but the Court did neither. Instead, Foster
is an opinion about how to do a close reading of the prosecutors' reasons
particularly when there are prosecutors' notes that call into question the
prosecutors' reasons. Although this lesson could be useful for appellate
courts because they have the luxury of time and a record, it provides little
guidance for trial judges who have to make Batson rulings quickly and with
limited information.
The starting point of any Batson challenge is the three-part test that the
Court delineated in Batson.'" Under Batson, a defendant first has to show
an inference of purposeful discrimination by the prosecutor in order to
establish a prima facie case. He can do this by showing that "he is a member
of a cognizable racial group," that peremptories permit discrimination by
those "who are of a mind to discriminate," and that the prosecutor has used
a peremptory to exclude a prospective juror on account of his or her race.l 2
The Batson Court instructed lower courts that they need to "undertake a
'factual inquiry' that 'takes into account all possible explanatory factors'
when assessing whether the defendant has established a prima facie case of
discriminatory peremptories.' 13 The Batson Court explained that a "pattern"
of discriminatory peremptories might give rise to an "inference of
discrimination" needed to establish a prima facie case, as would questions
or statements made by the prosecutor during voir dire, but it remained for
the trial judge to decide if the defendant had met his burden.l 14 Once the
defendant has established a prima facie case (step one), the burden shifts to
the prosecutor to provide race-neutral reasons for his peremptories (step
two)."' It then remains for the trial judge, at step three, to decide whether
those reasons are pretextual or not. In Foster, there was agreement that the
defendant had met his burden at step one and the prosecution had met its
burden at step two.1 1 6 The question in this case was whether the trial judge
should have found purposeful discrimination at step three.
Although Foster had raised his Batson challenge in a state habeas

"OId. at 1755.
'" Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98.
112 Id. at 96 (internal citations omitted).
...
Id. at 95 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Whereas Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 22728 (1965), had required the defendant to show that the prosecutor had engaged in discriminatory
peremptories in case after case, Batson required a showing only in the defendant's own case. Batson, 476
U.S. at 95.
" Batson, 476 U.S at 97.
116

Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1747.
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17and added the prosecutors' notes to his petition when he received
them, the state habeas court failed to reexamine the prosecutors' reasons
carefully in light of the prosecutors' notes."' Snyder instructs trial judges
when "considering a Batson objection," and reviewing courts when
considering "a ruling claimed to be Batson error," that "all of the
circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be
consulted.""1 9 The state habeas court did not do this; thus, the Supreme Court
undertook this analysis.
The Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, carefully
reviewed the reasons that the prosecution had given for striking two AfricanAmerican prospective jurors, Marilyn Garrett and Eddie Hood.1 20 The
prosecutors' notes, which suggested that race was considered by the
prosecutors throughout jury selection, required the Court to review the
prosecutors' reasons with the notes in mind.' 2' In doing so, the Court found
much amiss.1 22
The Court examined the prosecutors' reasons carefully and found
reasons that were inconsistent or not supported by the record. For example,
Prosecutor Lanier offered many reasons why he struck Marilyn Garrett and
Eddie Hood.1 23 Lanier said that he struck Garrett because the defense did not
ask her questions about insanity, alcohol, or publicity, even though the
transcript shows that the defense did.1 24 Lanier also explained that he struck
Garrett because she was divorced, even though he left on the jury three white
jurors who were also divorced.1 25 The prosecution gave eight reasons for
striking Hood, including that he had a son about the same age as the
defendant; the son had been convicted of a crime; and Hood was a member
of the Church of Christ.' 2 6 The Court found that some of the prosecution's
reasons for striking Hood were not applied to white prospective jurors and
still other reasons "shifted over time, suggesting that those reasons may be
pretextual."l27

court,'

A. Benefits of the Opinion
The Court's opinion in Foster, though it does not add anything new to
the Batson analysis, does provide several benefits. One benefit is that the
117

Id. at 1743.
'" Id. at 1748.
" Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008) (emphasis added).
120 Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1748.
121

Id. at 1749.

122 Id.

Id.
Id.
125 Id
26
1 1d.
27
1 Id.
123
24

1

at 1748-54.
at 1748-51.
at 1750.
at 1751-52.

at 1751.
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Court found a Batson violation, which is of great consequence to Foster.1 28
Another benefit is that it provides a model for how to do a close reading of
the reasons offered by a party to justify its exercise of a peremptory
challenge. The Court did not accept the prosecutors' reasons at face value;
rather, it looked carefully to see whether the reasons were supported by the
record and whether the prosecution applied these reasons consistently to
white prospective jurors as well as black prospective jurors.1 2 9 The opinion
also builds on the Court's approach in Miller-El v. Cockrell and Snyder v.
Louisiana. In both of these cases, the Court evaluated prosecutors' reasons
with great attention to detail because the jury selection practices in MillerEl and the prosecutors' reasons in Snyder raised concerns that race was the
actual motivation for the exercise of peremptory challenges, in spite of the
prosecutors' ostensibly race-neutral reasons.13 o In Foster, the prosecutors'
notes, like the jury selection practices in Miller-El, raised serious concerns,
which led the Court to review the prosecutors' reasons with the utmost
care.

1. Results for Foster
In his Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Foster asked the Supreme Court to
decide whether there had been a Batson violation during jury selection at his
trial.' 32 The Court adhered to the narrow question presented and held that
there had indeed been a Batson violation.133 Foster waited almost thirty years
for a court to reach this result.1 34 He raised the issue during jury selection at
his trial in 1987 and had a Batson hearing in which the trial judge denied his
Batson challenge.1 35 He again raised it in a motion for a new trial, after he
had been convicted and sentenced to death.' 3 ' The trial judge held an
evidentiary hearing and denied the Batson challenge once again.1 3 7 Foster
raised his Batson challenge on direct appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court
and that court rejected his claim as well.' 8 He then raised it before a state
habeas court, and while it was pending added the prosecutors' notes, which
"' Id. at 1742-43, 1755. Admittedly, the Supreme Court does not typically engage in error
correction, and if it does, it tries to do it through summary reversal in a per curiam opinion rather than

through plenary review, but of course in a capital case errors can have dire consequences.
29 Id. at 1750.
1o Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472,479-84 (2008); Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 331-35
(2003).
"' Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1748-54.
132

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 1, at i.

.33 Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1755.
13 Id.
"s Id. at 1742.
11

Id. at 1743.

137

Id.

138 Id.
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he obtained through the Georgia Open Records Act, but the state habeas
court and the Georgia Supreme Court rejected his Batson claim.139 Foster
waited a long time for a court to agree that prosecutors in his case had
violated Batson. His claim that his jury selection was conducted in violation
of Batson has finally been vindicated by a court, and not just by any court,
but by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Court's opinion not only vindicates Foster with respect to his
Batson claim, but also raises the possibility of a new trial. The Supreme
Court remanded the case to the state courts "for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion." 4 o As Justice Alito explained in his separate
opinion concurring in the judgment, the state courts will have to accept the
Supreme Court's analysis of federal law, but they can determine whether
Foster gets relief under state law.14 ' If state res judicata law does not bar
relief, then Foster could get a new trial.' 42 Though it is unlikely, the
prosecutor could decide not to retry Foster since he has already served thirty
years and a thirty-year old case might be hard to retry. If that were the case,
Foster would have gone from being on death row to being released from
prison. The benefit of the Court's opinion could make all the differencethe difference between death and freedom-to Foster.
The Court's opinion in Foster also reassures the public that a blatant
violation of Batson will not be ignored. The "smoking gun" in this casethe prosecutors' notes-revealed how omnipresent race was during jury
selection and how prosecutors used it to keep African-American prospective
jurors from serving on the jury. The reasons the prosecutors gave for the
exercise of their peremptory challenges might have seemed race neutral on
the surface, but the notes revealed the unspoken motive. If the Supreme
Court were to turn a blind eye to such notes, then there would be little left to
Batson. If the notes did not constitute a Batson violation, then the only way
to violate Batson would be for a lawyer to say that he or she struck a
prospective juror based on race. After thirty years of Batson, few lawyers
would make that mistake.
2. Providinga Modelfor a Close Reading ofReasons
Another benefit of the Court's opinion in Foster is that it provides an
example for lower courts, especially appellate courts, of how to read the
reasons and record carefully to see if there are inconsistencies that suggest
Id. at 1743, 1745 .140 Id. at 1755.
Id. at 1755.
141 Id. at 1760-61 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). The majority was less explicit than Justice
'3
1

Alito was about the state court's role, and focused mainly on the Court's jurisdiction to hear the claim:
"[The state habeas court's] invocation of res judicata therefore poses no impediment to our review of
Foster's Batson claim." Id at 1746-47.
142 See Mark Walsh, Bfor Black, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2016, at 20, 21 ("[Stephen] Bright believes his
client [Foster] will receive a new trial.[]").
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that the reasons were pretextual. The Court in Fosterdoes a close reading of
the prosecutors' reasons. Although the reasons, on the surface, seem race
neutral, the inconsistencies suggest otherwise. 143
The Court in Fosterfound different types of inconsistencies, including
an inconsistency between what the prosecutor said at one point in time and
what he said at another point in time. 1" For example, Prosecutor Lanier
originally explained at the Batson hearing before Foster's trial that he struck
prospective juror Eddie Hood for an array of reasons, but foremost was
because of Hood's son's age: "The only thing I was concernedabout, and I
will state it for the record. He has an eighteen year old son which is about
the same age as the defendant."' 45 At the evidentiary hearing after the trial,
Lanier gave Eddie Hood's religious affiliation as his main reason for striking
him from the jury: "And the bottom line on Eddie Hood is the Church of
Christ affiliation."' 4 6 The Court explained that a shift in reasons over time
suggests to it that the reasons "may be pretextual."' 4 7 Thus, one lesson that
lower courts can draw from the opinion is to look for a shift in reasons over
time.
Another type of inconsistency that suggests a reason might be pretextual
is when the prosecutor gives a reason for striking a black prospective juror
but does not apply that same reason to a white prospective juror. For
example, Lanier explained that one reason he struck Marilyn Garrett was
because she attended a high school near the neighborhood where the victim
lived, yet she said she was unfamiliar with the neighborhood.' 4 8 The
prosecutor concluded that Garrett was not being forthright in her responses
during voir dire. 49 However, when Martha Duncan, a white prospective
juror who lived near the neighborhood where the murder occurred, was
asked about her familiarity with the neighborhood, she said she was
unfamiliar with it; however, she was permitted to serve on the jury.s0 The
prosecutor interpreted the similar responses differently; Garrett had been
dishonest, whereas Duncan had been truthful.
The Court in Foster pointed to several other instances in which the
prosecutor's reason for striking a black prospective juror was not applied to
a white prospective juror. For example, Lanier said that he struck Eddie

i4 Foster, 136 S.

Ct. at 1748-54.

'" Id. at 1751.
145 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

'"Id.at 1752 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1751.

14

148

Id.

149 id.
150

Id.
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Hood because he had a son who was close in age to Foster,"' yet Lanier did
not strike Billy Graves, a white juror who had a seventeen-year old son, or
Martha Duncan, a white juror who had a twenty-year old son.152 Lanier said
that "he struck [Marilyn] Garrett because she was divorced[]. . . [b]ut he
declined to strike three out of the four white prospective jurors who were
also divorced."' The approach taken by the Court in Foster-finding a
reason to be pretextual if it is used to justify a strike of a black prospective
154
but the
juror but not a white prospective juror-is not original to Foster,
opinion in Foster reminds lower courts to look for such an inconsistency.
Indeed, lower courts have long relied on this type of inconsistency as an
indication that the reason is pretextual.'s
3.

Building on Miller-El and Snyder

Foster, even though it simply works within the Batson framework,
nonetheless builds upon Miller-El v. Cockrell"6 and Snyder v. Louisiana,5 7
and reinforces the point that courts need to give a close reading to the reasons
given for exercising a peremptory challenge, particularly if there are other
indications that race is a factor in a particular jury selection.
Miller-El v. Cockrell, in particular, suggests that reasons, even
seemingly race-neutral reasons, can be shown to be pretextual by racially
discriminatory practices. In Miller-El, a death penalty case involving an
African-American defendant and a white victim, the prosecutor struck ten
out of eleven African-American prospective jurors (91%) through the
exercise of his peremptory challenges, whereas he struck only four out of
thirty-one non-black prospective jurors (13%)."' The prosecutor also
engaged in three additional practices that revealed discriminatory treatment
of African-American prospective jurors. The prosecutor prefaced his
questioning of African-American prospective jurors by painting a vivid
picture of what the death penalty entailed and then asked African-American
prospective jurors if they thought they could impose the death penalty.
However, when the prosecutor questioned white prospective jurors, he did
not paint such a grim picture; thus, he made it easier for them to say they
15'

At the time ofjury selection, Hood's son was eighteen and Foster was nineteen. See supranote

36.
152 Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1752.
153
1'

Id. at 1750.
See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472,483 (2008) ("The implausibility of this explanation

is reinforced by the prosecutor's acceptance of white jurors who disclosed conflicting obligations that
appear to have been at least as serious as Mr. Brooks'.").

. See, e.g., United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The government stated
that it rejected juror Osuna due to his residence (La Mesa) .... However, another unchallenged juror

lived in La Mesa.").
156 537 U.S. 322 (2003).
157 552 U.S. at 472.
"s 537 U.S. at 331.
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could vote for the death penalty.1 5 9 The prosecutor also asked prospective
jurors about their willingness to impose the minimum sentence for murder.
Here, too, the question was phrased differently depending on the race of the
prospective juror. White prospective jurors were told what the statutory
minimum was and were asked if they could adhere to it, whereas AfricanAmerican prospective jurors were asked what they thought the minimum
should be.' Another practice, called "jury shuffling," enables parties in
Texas to ask the clerk to reshuffle the jury cards and reorder the prospective
jurors.16' The prosecutors in this case made use of jury shuffling whenever
a significant number of African-American prospective jurors had moved to
the front of the queue for consideration as jurors.' 62
In Miller-El, the Supreme Court identified these practices as revealing
race-based bias in jury selection even though the reasons given by the
prosecutor were ostensibly race neutral; Fosterraised a similar issue. The
prosecutors in Foster gave seemingly race-neutral reasons, but their notes
revealed that they exercised their peremptories based on race.' 63 Their notes
showed not only that they took race into account, but also that they viewed
African Americans in a negative light when it came to having them serve as
jurors in this death penalty case." The trial judge found the prosecutors'
reasons to be race neutral, but he did not have the prosecution's notes before
him.' 6 ' The state habeas court did have the notes, but did not find that the
notes undermined the reasons given by the prosecutors.' 66 Batson requires
lower courts to take account of "all possible explanatory factors" and "all
relevant circumstances,"'6 7 as reinforced by Snyder v. Louisiana.6 1 MillerEl provides precedent for lower courts to consider prosecutors' racially
discriminatory practices even if the reasons they give appear on the surface
IS9 Id at 332.

'60 d at 333.
"' See id. at 333-34 (explaining the process of"jury shuffling").
162 Id. at 334.
63 Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1744 (2016).
64

1

Id.

16s See id. at 1743.
'6 Id. at 1745.
67 Batson v. Kentucky,

476 U.S. 79, 95-97 (1986) (citation omitted). Although the Batson Court
instructed trial judges to take account of "all possible explanatory factors" and "all relevant
circumstances" that the defendant provided in trying to show "an inference of purposeful discrimination"

needed to establish a prima facie case at step one, id., the Miller-El Court explained that all of those
factors or circumstances should also be considered at step three when the trial judge had to decide whether
the defendant had met his burden of establishing purposeful discrimination: "It goes without saying that
this includes the facts and circumstances that were adduced in support of the prima facie case." MillerEl, 537 U.S. at 340.
..Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476-78 (2008) (instructing lower courts to consider whether
the prosecution's race-neutral reasons were a pretext for purposeful discrimination in light of "all of the

circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity").
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to be race neutral.' 69 Miller-El noted that discriminatory practices, such as
when "prosecutors marked the race of each prospective juror on their juror
cards," should serve as a signal to reviewing courts to consider that "race
was a factor."l 70 The state habeas court failed to give weight to such a
practice in Foster, as the Court had instructed in Miller-El and Snyder. The
Court reinforced that lesson in Foster.
Foster, like Snyder and Miller-El, provides a lesson to lower courts in
how to engage in a careful and fact-intensive analysis of the Batson
challenge before it. Snyder and Miller-El show that the Supreme Court is
willing to engage in a very close reading of the reasons and the record to
determine whether the prosecutor's seemingly race-neutral reasons should
be accepted. In Snyder, for example, Justice Alito, writing for the Court,
engaged in a very careful comparison between the reasons the prosecutors
gave for striking an African-American prospective juror because of another
obligation he had even though a white prospective juror with a more acute
conflict was permitted to serve on the jury.171 In Miller-El v. Cockrell,
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, examined the background jury
selection practices against which the prosecutor's peremptories had to be
assessed to determine whether they were race neutral. 172
If nothing else, Miller-El, Snyder, and now Foster, show that the
Supreme Court is serious about wanting trial judges and appellate courts to
scrutinize prosecutors' reasons carefully. These cases also show that the
Supreme Court is willing to engage in careful, fact-specific review even
when the reviewing courts are unwilling to do so. Thus, the Court's careful,
fact-specific review that it undertook in Snyder, Miller-El, and now Foster
puts lower courts on notice that they are to engage in a similarly careful
analysis of Batson challenges. Such an approach also teaches lower courts
that if they fail to review Batson challenges carefully, then the Court will
step in and undertake such review on its own, as it did in Fosterand Snyder,
and twice in Miller-El.17
B. Limitations of the Opinion
The opinion in Foster, even if viewed as simply answering the narrow
See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 343-46.
17 ld. at 347.
171 Snyder, 552 U.S. at 482-83.
169

172 Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 335 ("It is against this background that we examine whether petitioner's

case should be heard by the Court of Appeals.").
1' See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 266 (2005) (holding that the prosecutors' use of
discriminatory practices during jury selection undermined the race-neutral reasons that they gave for their
peremptory strikes of African-American prospective jurors; the Court reversed the Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit's judgment in light of the Batson violations that infected the jury selection); Miller-El,
537 U.S. at 348 (holding that in light of the race-based practices used by prosecutors during jury selection,

the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit erred in denying the defendant a certificate of appealability
(COA) from the district court's determination of no Batson violation).
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question whether there had been a Batson violation, has several limitations.
One limitation is that it does not provide a workable approach for trial
judges, who have neither the time nor the record to scrutinize the
prosecutor's reasons in the close way that the Supreme Court did. At best, it
is an approach that appellate courts could attempt, though they tend to be
deferential to the trial judge and the Supreme Court did not tell them to do
otherwise. Another limitation is that without some other indicia that race is
being used, such as prosecutors' notes or jury shuffling, trial judges have
little choice but to accept the prosecutor's seemingly race-neutral reasons.
There is little that they can do to discern otherwise. One exception is when
prosecutors give a reason for striking a black prospective juror but accept a
white prospective juror with the same characteristic. 174 However, not every
case will have white and African-American prospective jurors who are
similarly situated. Yet another limitation is that trial judges are supposed to
be able to assess the credibility of the prosecutor when he or she gives
reasons for a peremptory, but prosecutors, like most lawyers, can assert their
seemingly race-neutral reasons with confidence. They might even convince
themselves that their reasons are race neutral. 175 A trial judge will have little
basis to probe a prosecutor's reasons very deeply and many reasons to accept
what the prosecutor has said.
1.

An Unworkable Approachfor TrialJudges

The kind of close reading that the Supreme Court gave to the
prosecutors' reasons and the record in Fosterare not usually available to a
trial court judge when a party raises a Batson challenge during jury selection.
The approach that the Court took in Fosteris not a model for a trial judge in
the courtroom. If it is a model for any lower court, it would be an appellate
court, and appellate courts tend to defer to the trial judge. The Supreme
Court needs to instruct appellate courts that their review of a Batson
challenge needs to be less deferential to the trial judge and more searching
of the reasons and the record.
a. Limited Time and Record
As the record made clear in Foster, the trial judge held a Batson hearing
174 See infra Section H.B.3 (describing this approach in greater detail).

"' See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("A
prosecutor's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion that a
prospective black juror is 'sullen,' or 'distant,' a characterization that would not have come to his mind

if a white juror had acted identically."); Walsh, supra note 142, at 21 (quoting Maureen A. Howard, a
former Washington state prosecutor and now a law professor, who explained that prosecutors might
exercise discriminatory peremptories because of unconscious bias in which they are "unaware of their

own implicit bias when analyzing their reasons for dismissing a potential juror of color").
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during which he heard several reasons from the prosecutor for striking Eddie
Hood. He was then prepared to accept that the prosecution's four
peremptories against four African-American prospective jurors were not
177
race based.1 7 6 However, the prosecutor, who wanted to perfect the record,
was permitted to give reasons for the additional three African-American
prospective jurors he struck. The reasons the prosecutor provided were
numerous and specific and the trial judge accepted them as race neutral.
Judge Frazier, the trial judge, had another opportunity to assess the
prosecutors' reasons during the evidentiary hearing that he held after Foster
had filed a motion for a new trial. 178At that hearing, which came after the
trial and after a jury verdict of guilty and a sentence of death, there was
extensive examination of the prosecutors' reasons for striking the four
African-American prospective jurors. 17 9 At that point, the trial judge might
have been able to discern the shift that the Supreme Court noted, in which
the prosecutor had originally emphasized that he struck Eddie Hood because
of his son's age and past conviction, whereas later he highlighted that he
struck Hood because of his affiliation with the Church of Christ.so However,
the prosecutor offered numerous reasons for each strike and explained that
he had not relied on any one reason. The prosecutor had also said that he
looked at an individual as a unique mix of characteristics and it was not any
one characteristic that was decisive for him.'"' He also explained that with
only ten peremptory challenges (as opposed to the defendant's twenty), he
could not really select the jurors he wanted, but could only eliminate those
he thought would be least willing to vote for the death penalty.' 8 2
Judge Frazier, in his opinion in which he denied Foster's motion for a
new trial, assessed the reasons the prosecutor had given to explain his
peremptory strikes. The trial judge acknowledged that some reasons were
less likely than others to predict juror behavior, but he nevertheless found
them to be race neutral.' 83 At this point, most trial judges have too little
information with which to work. In addition, after having gone through a
trial, they are probably reluctant to disturb a jury's verdict and sentence.

"'See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
"' Batson Hearing Transcript, supranote 33, at 99.
"'Transcript of Hearing on Motion for New Trial, supranote 29, at 69.

' Id. at 93-112.
"s CompareBatson Hearing Transcript, supranote 33, at 44, with Transcript of Hearing on Motion
for New Trial, supranote 29, at I10-11.
"' Transcript of Hearing on Motion for New Trial, supranote 29, at 96.
182

Id. at 103.

See Order on Motion for New Trial, supra note 59, at 138-39 (explaining that the trial judge
thought Mary Turner's employment at Northwest Georgia Regional Hospital was unlikely to predict how
she would view the case, but that other reasons the prosecutor gave for striking her from the jury were
neutral and legitimate).
183
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b. The Difficulties of Assessing the Prosecutor's Reasons and

Credibility
The Batson Court left trial judges to figure out how to implement
Batson.'8 4 This approach seemed reasonable, at least to the majority in
Batson,'" because trial judges are in the courtroom. They can observe the
lawyers and prospective jurors during jury selection and they can hear the
reasons given by a prosecutor once the defendant has raised a Batson
challenge.
The problem is that trial judges do not have the tools that are available
to the Supreme Court when it reviews a Batson challenge, and the tools that
trial judges have do not tell them very much. When a defendant raises a
Batson challenge during jury selection, the trial judge has the reasons that
the prosecutor gives during a sidebar or a Batson hearing. There is no
extensive record at this point. Yet, the trial judge will need to make a
decision so that jury selection can proceed. Although the trial judge has the
prosecutors' reasons, after thirty years of Batson, there are myriad reasons
that have long been found to be acceptable.' One judge highlighted how
well-known and contradictory the reasons are by compiling a list, based on
Illinois case law, which he thought prosecutors could distribute under the
title "'Handy Race-Neutral Explanations' or '20 Time-Tested Race-Neutral
Explanations.""' 8 7 When a prosecutor provides one or more of these reasons,
the trial judge has little choice but to find the reason to be race neutral. As
Purkett v. Elem'" established, the reasons for a peremptory can be "silly or
superstitious" or even unrelated to the case, just as long as they are not based
on race. 189
A prosecutor knows not only which reasons are acceptable, but also how
to present them. One reason appellate courts are supposed to defer to the trial
judge's finding is that the trial judge is in the courtroom. He or she is
" Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 n.24 (1986) ("In light of the variety of jury selection
practices followed in our state and federal trial courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts how

best to implement our holding today.").
..
sChief Justice Burger, writing in dissent, criticized the majority for leaving trial judges with an
impossible task. He observed: "The Court essentially wishes these [trial] judges well as they begin the
difficult enterprise of sorting out the implications of the Court's newly created 'right.' I join my
colleagues in wishing the Nation's judges well as they struggle to grasp how to implement today's
holding." Id. at 131.
' See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text (providing cases with many of the acceptable
reasons).

' People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 66 (111. App. Ct. 1996). Among the many acceptable reasons
are the following: "[T]oo old, too young, divorced, 'long, unkempt hair,' free-lance writer, religion,
social worker, renter, lack of family contact, attempting to make eye-contact with defendant, 'lived in an
area consisting predominantly of apartment complexes,' single, [and] over-educated." Id. at 65-66
(footnotes omitted).
" 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam).
'"Id. at 768.
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supposed to be able to assess the credibility of the prosecutor or the body
language of a juror. The difficulty is that the prosecutor can present his or
her reasons with confidence, like most lawyers making an argument in court.
In addition, a prosecutor is a repeat player in the courtroom and has defended
Batson challenges before. A judge would be hard pressed to find that the
prosecutor's delivery was not credible.
Although the judge is indeed in the courtroom, he or she might not
observe every prospective juror with the same attention to detail that a party
does. Thus, when the prosecutor says that he struck a prospective juror
because of her body language or demeanor, such as too much or too little
eye contact, the judge might not have observed the prospective juror's eye
contact with the prosecutor. After all, it is in each party's interest to be
particularly observant, whereas the trial judge, who certainly tries to be
observant, also has responsibility for presiding over the proceeding and
maintaining order in the courtroom. The prosecutor might focus exclusively
on the prospective juror during voir dire, whereas the judge will have the
entire courtroom to observe. Thus, the judge has little choice but to accept
the prosecutor's observations.
2.

The LimitedRole ofAppellate Courts

The tools that the Supreme Court used to assess the Batson challenge in
Fosterare tools that are more readily available to an appellate court than a
trial judge. An appellate court has the time to review the record and to do a
careful reading of the reasons the prosecutor has given and to see if the
reasons have been applied inconsistently or have shifted over time. The
Court in Foster should have made clear to appellate courts that they are
expected to do the kind of close reading that Court did in Foster.190 The
problem is that appellate courts, following the instruction of Batson, have
said that trial judges are in the best position to decide a Batson challenge
because they are in the courtroom and can observe the demeanor and body
language ofjurors and assess the credibility of the prosecutor." As a result,
appellate courts tend to defer to a trial judge's determinations. However, the
trial judge has limited tools to discern race-based peremptories. The trial
judge does not have the tools that an appellate court has to undertake a close
190 Perhaps the Court in Fosterwas reticent to instruct state appellate courts to undertake a close
reading of the prosecutor's reasons because the Court wants to be respectful of state courts and would
prefer to issue such a reminder to federal courts of appeals. If this is the case, then perhaps the Court will
offer such guidance in the next Batson challenge it agrees to hear coming from a federal court, though in
my view, it would be preferable for the Court to abandon Batson altogether. See infra Section V.
"' The Seventh Circuit, for example, has said that deference to the trial judge is appropriate because
the trial judge is in the courtroom and is in the best position to make these factual findings. Tinner v.

United Ins. Co. of Am., 308 F.3d 697, 703 (7th Cir. 2002). The Seventh Circuit further explained that it
would accept a trial judge's rulings in a Batson challenge unless they were "completely outlandish" or

their "falsity" was readily apparent. Id (quoting United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir.),
and modified, 136 F.3d 1115 (1998)).

1166

CONNECTICUTLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 49:1137

reading, and the tools that the trial judge does have do not tell her much.
Without some indication that the prosecutor's reasons are not what they
seem, the trial judge has little to base her decision on but the reasons the
prosecutor has given.
3. Close Readings in Limited Cases
Both trial judges and appellate courts seem to be in need of more than
the prosecutor's reasons in order to find that the reasons are race based. In
Foster, the Supreme Court had the prosecutors' notes and in Miller-El it had
the discriminatory practices like jury shuffling. This means that in cases
without these practices, it is difficult to establish a Batson challenge just
based on the reasons the prosecutor gave. There is a litany of acceptable
reasons and prosecutors make use of them. Once they do, their peremptories
are usually reversal proof. The reasons are not usually scrutinized unless
there is some discriminatory practice that suggests that race was part of the
jury selection. Without such a practice, however, the reasons tend to be
accepted and the Batson challenge fails.
Although the Court is justified in taking account of discriminatory
practices and scrutinizing prosecutors' reasons carefully when such
practices have been used, it is a limited approach because it affords no
protection in cases that do not entail discriminatory practices. Even though
a single race-based peremptory challenge violates the U.S. Constitution,1 9 2
without the addition of a discriminatory practice, courts will be hard pressed
to find a Batson violation. In such cases, it will be difficult for a defendant
to show that the prosecutor's reasons are pretextual. The African-American
prospective juror who is struck by a prosecutor's race-based peremptory
challenge in a case in which there are no prosecutors' notes or jury shuffling
will be removed from the jury with little recourse. The defendant can raise
a Batson challenge, but the prosecutor will give a seemingly race-neutral
reason and the peremptory will be allowed. Without the telltale
discriminatory practice to signal that race might have played a role in the
prosecutor's peremptory, the prospective juror will be removed and even an
appellate court is unlikely to look further.
The one time that reasons without a discriminatory practice might
suffice is when the prosecutor gives a reason for striking an AfricanAmerican prospective juror but does not apply that reason to a white
prospective juror. The Court in Foster made use of this approach. For
example, the Court was able to find inconsistencies when the prosecutor
explained, as one of his reasons for striking Eddie Hood, that Hood's son's
192 Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747 (2016) (quoting Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472,
478 (2008)).
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age was close to Foster's age, but the prosecutor accepted white jurors whose
sons' ages were close to Foster's age.' 93 Similarly, the prosecutor explained
that one reason for striking Marilyn Garrett was her young age (thirty-four),
even though the prosecutor left on the jury eight white prospective jurors
who were under the age of thirty-six.' 94 However, the limitation of this
approach is that not every case will have black and white prospective jurors
who are similarly situated. Thus, in the case in which a prosecutor exercises
a peremptory challenge against a black prospective juror because of race,
but explains that the strike is because the prospective juror lives in a certain
neighborhood, and there is no white prospective juror who also lives in that
neighborhood, the peremptory will usually be adjudged race neutral. The
Court's careful reading, in which it scrutinizes the prosecutor's reasons for
inconsistent application, is useful, but only in certain cases. The Court's
approach will not be useful when the venire lacks a white prospective juror
with the same characteristic as the black prospective juror who has just been
struck.
III.

TWEAKING THE BATSON TEST

In Foster,the Court provided a close reading of the reasons given by the
prosecutor and found that they were race based, and thus, in violation of
Batson."' The Court undertook this close reading primarily because Foster
had obtained the prosecutors' notes which revealed that the prosecutors had
focused on prospective jurors' race throughout jury selection. The notes
included a list of "definite NO's" and the five African-American prospective
jurors who remained on the venire were on that list.' 96 The Court's reading
is fact-intensive and of limited utility to lower courts, except insofar as it
shows appellate courts that they can engage in this kind of careful reading
and review of a prosecutor's reasons, particularly when there are other
indicia of discrimination during jury selection, such as prosecutors' notes.
Foster is a straightforward application of Batson. It does not call into
question the three-step test in Batson or consider how the test can be made
more effective. This Section takes up the challenge that Foster did not
address, which is how the test in Batson can be made more effective, to the
extent it can.
In the past, the Court used several Batson challenge cases to clarify the
various steps of the three-step Batson test. In some cases, such as Johnson
v. California,'97 the Court's clarification of step one removed a hurdle that
193

14

19
16

See supranotes 151-52 and accompanying text.

Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1750.

1Id. at 1755.
Id. at 1744.

'9 545 U.S. 162, 168-69 (2005) (holding that California's standard, in which an objector to a
peremptory challenge "must show that it is more likely than not [that] the other party's peremptory
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California had erected before objectors to a peremptory challenge could
proceed with a Batson challenge. In other cases, such as Purkett v. Elem, 98
the Court's clarification of reasons needed at step two versus step three made
it harder for an objector to succeed with a Batson challenge. By permitting
the proponent of the peremptory to give any reason at all no matter how silly
or unrelated to the case, it gave the proponent greater cover when exercising
discriminatory peremptories and it gave judges and objectors less useful
information to work with when trying to determine whether a peremptory
was discriminatory.
Fosterhighlights the difficulties that a criminal defendantl 99 faces at step
three of the Batson test. What if a prosecutor gives race-neutral reasons in
court, but is motivated by race-based reasons that are revealed through his
notes? The Court could tweak step three by making it clear that a defendant
can obtain information, including the prosecution's notes, through a
discovery request that would help to reveal the prosecutor's purposeful
discrimination. In doing so, the Court would ensure that defendants can rely
on "all possible explanatory factors" and "all relevant circumstances" as
Batson provided20 0 and "all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of
racial animosity" as Snyder reinforced.2 0' The problem, however, is that
prosecutors might respond by no longer taking notes during jury selection,
just as they now no longer give race as a reason for exercising a peremptory
challenge.
Alternatively, the Court could make explicit that at step three purposeful
discrimination can be inferred if the peremptory has a "discriminatory
challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias" created a higher hurdle for an
objector to meet than Batson's standard at step one, which only required an objector to establish a prima

facie case based on facts that give "rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose").
`8 514 U.S. 765, 768-70 (1995) (per curiam) (holding that it is not until step three of the three-step
Batson test that a trial court determines whether the opponent of a peremptory strike has met his burden

of proving purposeful discrimination, and that the reason given by the proponent of the strike at step two
can be silly or frivolous as long as it is race neutral). The Court made it easier for the prosecution to
defend against a Batson challenge by indicating that any reason, no matter how silly, could be given at
step two, and it would be up to the judge to decide at step three whether the reason was pretextual or not.
The reason had only to be race neutral; it no longer had to be "related to the particular case to be tried,"

as Batson had required. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986).
'" Although Foster involves a Batson challenge that a criminal defendant made to the prosecutors'
exercise of peremptories based on race, after the Batson progeny, see supranotes 4-7, an objector is not

limited to a criminal defendant, but includes prosecutors in criminal cases and lawyers in civil cases and
expands Batson to include peremptories based on any race, gender, or ethnicity. I will refer to the

prosecutor, given the facts of Foster, but all lawyers' peremptories can be the subject of a Batson
challenge.

'00 Batson, 476 U.S. at 95-97.
201 Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008) ("[1]n considering a Batson objection, or in
reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial

animosity must be consulted.") (citation omitted).
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effect" or is based on a "discriminatory practice." The defendant could draw
on statistical or historical evidence or the facts of his individual case to show
the former, or he could look to ongoing or past practices to show the latter.
A. ObtainingAll Information
The practical challenge of Batson is that it is very difficult for a
defendant to show that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge
based on race. Once the prosecutor has provided seemingly race-neutral
reasons at step two, it remains for the trial judge to decide whether the
defendant has established purposeful discrimination on the part of the
prosecutor at step three. The problem is that the prosecutor can give raceneutral reasons that are detailed, specific, and reasonable, and can deliver
them in court in a credible manner. Once the prosecutor has done this, it
basically immunizes his peremptory challenge from further scrutiny by the
trial judge. After all, the Court in Batson said that a prosecutor's reason for
exercising a peremptory did not have to rise to the level of a for cause
challenge.20 2 Moreover, appellate court judges have indicated that with only
a cold, hard transcript before them, they are unwilling to question the factual
findings of the trial judge.2 03 Indeed, appellate court judges simply follow
the guidance provided by Batson insofar as the Batson Court observed that
the trial judge is in the best position to make this step-three determination
and that reviewing courts should treat this determination with deference.20 4
Fostermakes clear what a difficult and lengthy process it can be for a
defendant to try to obtain any information that might undermine a
prosecutor's seemingly race-neutral reasons even when the defendant
suspects from the beginning that the prosecutor is likely to exercise racebased peremptories. Indeed, the defendant in Foster filed an early motion,
dated December 11, 1986, in which he sought to preclude the prosecution
from using its peremptory challenges to exclude blacks;205 however, the trial
judge denied the motion. During jury selection, the defendant made a Batson
challenge when the prosecutor struck all four remaining African-American
prospective jurors from the venire. The trial judge held a Batson hearing at
which he denied the defendant's Batson challenge. 206 After the defendant
was convicted and sentenced to death, the defendant sought to obtain a copy
202

Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 ("[W]e emphasize that the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the

level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.").
203 See supra note 191.
204 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 (drawing from Title VII sex discrimination cases, the Court
noted
that "[s]ince the trial judge's findings in the context under consideration here likely will turn on

evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference").
205 Motion to Preclude the Prosecution from Using Its Peremptory Challenges to Exclude Blacks,

in I Joint App. at 17, Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct 1737 (2016) (No. 14-8349).
206

Batson Hearing Transcript, supranote 33, at 49, 58, 60.
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of the prosecution's notes through a Motion for Post-Judgment Discovery.2 07
After the judge denied that motion, the defendant filed a Motion for a New
Trial, in which he renewed his Batson challenge and was able to question
the prosecutors in court, but he was still unable to obtain their notes.2 08
During the hearing on the Motion for a New Trial, the prosecutors provided
many race-neutral reasons to explain their peremptories, and the trial judge
issued a very complete and detailed opinion explaining why he found the
prosecutor's reasons to be race neutral, specific, and credible.209
It was many years later, after the passage of the Georgia Open Records
Act in 2002,210 that Foster was able to obtain the prosecutors' notes. But for
the fortuitous passage of this state statute and the persistence of the
defendant, the defendant would never have obtained the notes. What about
defendants in states that lack such a FOIA-like 211 statute? What recourse do
they have? A revised step three that enables defendants to make a discovery
request that would give them access to the prosecution's notes, manuals, or
other jury selection practices would give them information that is currently
unavailable to them. Such information would give defendants a unique
window into the motives of prosecutors and assist them in meeting the
difficult step-three standard of establishing "purposeful discrimination."
The prosecutors' notes in Foster provide a rare window into the
prosecution's actual view of African-American jurors in capital cases, even
as the prosecutors denied that they had acted based on race or held any racebased views. Indeed, the prosecutors stressed that their reasons were all
race-neutral" and that they were not racists.212 Sometimes documents or
practices, such as the prosecutors' notes in Foster or the prosecutors'
reliance on jury shuffles in Miller-El, provide the only indicia that race is a
factor once the prosecutor has given his seemingly race-neutral reasons. In
these cases, the actions of the prosecutors, in shuffling the juror cards or in
marking down the prospective jurors' race on their juror cards, illustrate the
old adage that "actions speak louder than words."
If prosecutors knew that defendants would have easy access to their
notes, practices, and office manuals with respect to jury selection, then
perhaps they would stop using these mechanisms to engage in
207 Motion for Post-Judgment Discovery, supranote 48, at 63.
208 Transcript of Hearing on Motion for New Trial, supranote 29, at 78-79 ("But Ijust would like,

if I take the stand, I would like for defense counsel to be put on notice that I don't want him to have
access to my file.") (quoting Prosecutor Lanier).
209 Order on Motion for New Trial, supra note 59, at 143.

See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-18-70 to 50-18-77 (2002).
211 Public Information Act of 1966 (commonly known as the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)),
Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)).
210

212

Transcript of Hearing on Motion for New Trial, supranote 29, at 95 ("We're being called racist

for doing our jobs.") (quoting Prosecutor Pullen).
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discriminatory peremptories. If they did not have these tools, perhaps
prosecutors would have to change their behavior. Even if they did not change
their behavior completely, it would at least be more difficult to engage in
discriminatory peremptories without the requisite tools.
However, even granting discovery requests by either party 213 as part of
step three is not a panacea. It is just as likely that prosecutors would simply
find other ways of exercising race-based peremptories. For example, if
prosecutors knew their notes had to be turned over to the defendant, then
they would be likely to take great care not to include race as part of their
notes. Just as the prosecutors in Fostergave gender as a reason for excluding
African-American women from the jury, but would not give that reason
today in light of JE.B.,214 so too would they learn not to take notes indicating
the race of the prospective jurors, if notes were readily discoverable after
Foster.
B. InferringDiscriminatoryIntentfrom DiscriminatoryEffect or Practice
Another way to tweak step three would be for the Court to make explicit
that discriminatory intent can be inferred from a "discriminatory effect" or
"discriminatory practice." These inferences (which are used in step one to
establish a prima facie case) would allow the defendant to focus on the
actions the prosecutor had taken or the effects the prosecutor's actions had
without having to probe the depths of the prosecutor's psyche to determine
what had inspired him or her to take those actions. In the end, however,
prosecutors would still be able to work around these tweaks.
1.

DiscriminatoryEffect

If the defendant had to show at step three-after he established a prima
facie case at step one and after the prosecutor gave seemingly race-neutral
reasons at step two-that the prosecutor's exercise of his or her peremptory
challenge had a "discriminatory effect" from which discriminatory intent
could be inferred, then the defendant would have met his burden for a Batson
challenge. There are several ways a defendant (or any objector) could do

213 Although the problem of race-based peremptories is most acute for criminal defendants trying
to expose the discriminatory peremptories of prosecutors, particularly in death penalty cases in the South
when the defendant is an African American and the victim is white, the Equal Protection Clause requires
both parties-prosecutor and defendant-to refrain from engaging in discriminatory peremptories. See,
e.g., EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING

LEGACY 14 (2010), http://eji.org/sites/default/files/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3K84-6NH8] [hereinafter EJI REPORT]. As Justice Marshall observed in his
concurrence in Batson: "Our criminal justice system requires not only freedom from any bias against the
accused but also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and the state the scales are to

be evenly held." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,107 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (internal citation
omitted).
2 14
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex ret. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (holding that gender-based peremptory
challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

1172

[Vol. 49:1137

this. One way would be if the prosecutor exercised his or her peremptories
against all or most of the remaining African-American prospective jurors,
then the defendant could establish that the prosecutor had used peremptories
in a manner that had a "discriminatory effect." The effect would be
discriminatory to the defendant because the defendant would be tried by a
jury from which all or most of the prospective jurors of his race (or of a
particular race) had been struck. The defendant could rely on the
discriminatory effect from the prosecutor's use of peremptories that enabled
the prosecutor to create an all-white or almost all-white jury to infer
discriminatory intent.
In Miller-El v. Cockrell, Justice Kennedy relied on the discriminatory
effect of the prosecutor's use of peremptories to strike ten out of eleven
African-American prospective jurors from the jury as a backdrop for
assessing the prosecutor's reasons.215 From this nearly all-white jury, the
Court could infer discriminatory intent from this discriminatory effect. In
addition, as Justice Kennedy noted, "[t]hese numbers, while relevant, are not
petitioner's whole case." 2 16 Although he did not rely wholly upon this effect,
it was one of the factors that he took into account in Miller-El,2 17 and he
described it as a backdrop against which to assess whether the prosecutor's
reasons were pretextual. The Court could use its next Batson challenge case
to make this consideration more explicit or to permit the discriminatory
effect to satisfy step three without having to parse the prosecutor's reasons.
For example, in Foster, the prosecutors eliminated all four of the remaining
African-American prospective jurors from the jury so that Foster was tried
by an all-white jury. Under a revised step three, that would suffice to show
that the prosecutor exercised discriminatory peremptories.
The problem with inferring discriminatory intent from "discriminatory
effect" at step three is that eventually prosecutors will figure out how many
African-American prospective jurors they can strike with peremptories
without triggering the "discriminatory effect" standard. For example, it may
be that they could strike some but not all remaining African-American
prospective jurors without running afoul of the "discriminatory effect"
standard. Courts would have to draw a line and prosecutors would then work
within that line. Yet, the Court has said that the exercise of even one
discriminatory peremptory is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.2 18

2 16

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 331 (2003).
d

217

Id. at 335 ("It is against this background that we examine whether the petitioner's case should

21

be heard
by the Court of Appeals.").
218
See, e.g., Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct 1737, 1755 (2016) (noting that exercising two peremptory
strikes on the basis of race is unconstitutional); Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 ('A single invidiously
discriminatory governmental act' is not 'immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making
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A standard that looked to discriminatory effect would not help in the case of
the prosecutor exercising one discriminatory peremptory because one
peremptory would probably not be sufficient to show a discriminatory effect
even though the Court has said that just one discriminatory peremptory is a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
2. DiscriminatoryPractice

'

Another way to tweak step three is to infer discriminatory intent from a
"discriminatory practice." The defendant would have to show that the
prosecutor had engaged in a discriminatory practice, from which he could
infer discriminatory motive without having to rely wholly upon the
prosecutor's reasons. The defendant could focus on the practices of the
prosecutor in his case, or on the practices of the prosecutorial office or the
practices in that judicial district or even in that state. This approach would
draw from the approaches taken in Swain2 19 and Batson2 20 and would make
either approach or both approaches available to the defendant.
The Court in Swain v. Alabama held that a peremptory challenge
exercised on the basis of race violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but to prevail the defendant had to show that the
prosecutor had exercised discriminatory peremptories in case after case.22
This was exceedingly difficult for a defendant to show, and it effectively
immunized prosecutors' discriminatory peremptories from any challenges at
all. The Court in Batson finally recognized the "crippling burden of proof'
that Swain had imposed on defendants.222 Therefore, the Batson Court tried
to make the evidentiary requirement less onerous. Batson permitted a
defendant to show that the prosecutor in his case alone had exercised
peremptories on the basis of race. 223 Although the Court in Batson attempted
to create a less onerous evidentiary burden than Swain, the Batson test
proved difficult for defendants to satisfy. Prosecutors became adept at
offering seemingly race-neutral reasons and trial judges found it difficult to
discern whether those reasons were race neutral or not.
If step three were tweaked so that the defendant could rely on a
"discriminatory practice" to infer discriminatory intent, and he could do it
either by showing that the prosecutor in his case had engaged in a
of other comparable decisions."') (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 n.14 (1977)).
219 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227 (1965) ("But the defendant must, to pose the issue,
show the prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory challenges against Negroes over a period of time.").
220

See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) ("[A] defendant may establish a prima facie

case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the
prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial.").
221

See Swain, 380 U.S. at 227.

222 Batson, 476 U.S. at 92.
223 Id. at 96.
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discriminatory practice, such as the jury shuffling in Miller-Elv. Cockrell,22 4
or by using statistical or historical evidence 225 to show that in case after case,
African-American prospective jurors were removed through peremptories
by a particular prosecutorial office, or in a particular judicial district, or in a
particular state, then the defendant might have a greater chance of satisfying
step three than he currently does.
Inferring discriminatory intent from a "discriminatory practice" would
be less onerous than establishing intent only through the reasons given by
the prosecutor. In addition, the defendant would be able to show a
"discriminatory practice" in different ways. He could point to the particular
practice of the prosecutor in his case, just as Miller-El did.226 Or, he could
point to practices over time and employ statistical evidence that would
establish that the striking of African-American prospective jurors in large
enough numbers could not be due just to chance, and that race was the
underlying reason. For example, in death penalty cases from one county in
Alabama between the years 2005 to 2009, prosecutors used peremptory
challenges to remove eighty percent of qualified African-American
prospective jurors. 2 27 The problem with Batson's emphasis on the individual
case is that it does not allow for a large enough sample size to use statistical
analysis. Numbers can be powerful. Inferring discriminatory intent from a
"discriminatory practice" would focus the discussion on the institutional
practices that permit a prosecutor to use peremptories in a discriminatory
manner, rather than looking only for the motives behind the peremptories,
which are exceedingly difficult to uncover.
The problem with a "discriminatory practice," however, is that it still
permits prosecutors to exercise discriminatory peremptories, but simply to
do so without employing a discriminatory practice. They would have to take
care not to use an identifiable "discriminatory practice," such as jury
shuffling 228 or venire lists that are color-coded for race. 22 9 Even if they
stopped using these established practices, this does not mean they would
stop exercising discriminatory peremptories. The individual prosecutor
could still exercise a discriminatory peremptory in an individual case. If the
See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 333-34 (2003) (describing "jury shuffling").
" See, e.g., id. at 334-35 (describing the practice of Dallas County assistant district attorneys from
the late 1950s to the early 1960s of systematically excluding African Americans from juries).
224

226

See id. at 346 ("Even though the practice ofjury shuffling might not be denominated as a Batson

claim because it does not involve a peremptory challenge, the use of the practice here tends to erode the
credibility of the prosecution's assertion that race was not a motivating factor injury selection.").
227 See Henry R. Chalmers, A Long Way to Go: Report Finds Lingering, Hard-to-Eradicate
Discriminationin Jury Selection, LITIG. NEWS, Fall 2010, at 6, 7; see also EJI REPORT, supra note 213,

at 4.
228
229

See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 253 (2005); Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 333-34.
See, e.g., Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct 1737, 1744-45 (2016).
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prosecutor gave seemingly race-neutral reasons at step two, and if he or she
did not use an identifiable discriminatory practice at step three, there would
be little that the ordinary defendant could do to challenge the peremptory. It
might be that a defendant could make use of statistics, but it would be hard
for an individual defendant to collect statistics in other cases. After all, that
was the "crippling evidentiary burden" imposed in Swain and finally
recognized in Batson.230
The Court in Miller-El v. Cockrell moved in the direction of inferring
discriminatory intent from discriminatory practices. There were a number of
discriminatory practices in Miller-El that provided further context for
evaluating the prosecutors' reasons. During voir dire, the prosecutors framed
questions to African-American prospective jurors differently than they did
to white prospective jurors.2 3 1 Similarly, they framed questions about the
willingness to impose a minimum sentence for murder differently for
23 2
I
African-American prospective jurors than for white prospective jurors.
addition, the prosecutors resorted to jury shuffling whenever AfricanAmerican prospective jurors moved up to the front of the panel for jury
consideration, and the district attorney's office had a history of excluding
African-American prospective jurors from the venire, and that practice was
passed down from one generation to the next.233 Justice Kennedy explained
that the prosecutors' strikes had to be evaluated in the context of these
discriminatory practices: "It is against this background that we examine
234
whether petitioner's case should be heard by the Court of Appeals."
The Court in Foster did use "discriminatory effects" (striking all four
African-American prospective jurors remaining on the venire) and
"discriminatory practices" (including a highlighted venire list based on race,
circling the race on the questionnaire of African Americans, indicating "B"
on juror cards of African Americans, and including their names on a
"definite NO's" list) as the backdrop against which the prosecutors' reasons
are to be assessed.235 However, the Court still assessed the prosecutors'
reasons.23 6 It did find the reasons to be race based after finding
inconsistencies.2 37 The inconsistencies included reasons that shifted over
time and that were given to explain peremptories exercised against AfricanAmerican prospective jurors but were not used to strike white jurors with
similar characteristics. The Court in Foster used the prosecutors' notes to
shine a light on the prosecutors' reasons, but it still assessed the reasons and
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986).
See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 332-33.
232 Id
233 Id. at 333-34
234 Id. at 335 (emphasis added).
235 See Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1744 (2016).
236
Id. at 1754.
237 Id.
230
231
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found them to be inconsistent, and therefore, pretextual.2 38
The Court could make clear that at step three a prosecutor's reasons need
to be reviewed against the backdrop of discriminatory effects or practices.
A reason that seems race neutral on the surface should not be found to be
race neutral if the prosecutor engaged in discriminatory practices, or
practices that had discriminatory effects, during jury selection. The difficulty
remains, however, that in the ordinary Batson challenge, discriminatory
practices might not be present or might not come to light. If the prosecutors'
notes in Foster had not been turned over to the defendant years later, the
prosecution's reasons for its peremptory challenges would not have been
questioned.
IV. STRENGTHENING THE REMEDY FOR A BA TSON VIOLATION

Another way to approach the practical difficulties that Batson presents
for defendants is to strengthen the remedy for a Batson violation so as to
deter prosecutors from engaging in discriminatory peremptories. The Court
could look to experimentation in states such as North Carolina,239 which
enacted the North Carolina Racial Justice Act of 2009 (RJA). 24 o The RJA,
though short-lived,24 1included a remedy to deter prosecutors from engaging
in discriminatory peremptories and tools that made it easier for capital case
defendants to succeed with Batson challenges.
A. Taking Death Off the Table
One way that the RJA tried to deter race-based peremptory challenges
by prosecutors in North Carolina was by providing that the remedy for a
Batson violation in a death penalty case would be life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole rather than death.24 2 In Batson, the Supreme Court
Id
Justice Brandeis suggested this approach when he wrote: "[A] single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
24 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws § 15A-2011(b)(2) (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A2011 (b)(2)(2012)) (repealed 2013).
241 The RJA was amended in 2012. 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136 § 15A-201 1(c). The amendment
reduced the geographic scope of the statistical evidence. The 2009 RJA permitted use of statistical
evidence from the county, prosecutorial district, Superior Court division, or the state at the time of trial,
whereas the 2012 amendment limited the statistical evidence to "the county or prosecutorial district
where the defendant was sentenced to death." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-201 1(d) (2012). The RJA was
repealed by S.L. 2013-154, § 5(a) (2013).
242 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-201 1(g) (2012), repealedby N.C. S.L. 2013-154, § 5(a) (2013); see
also Campbell Robertson, Judge in North Carolina Voids 3 Death Sentences, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/14/us/citing-race-north-carolina-judge-voids-death238
239
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instructed lower courts, according to its three-step test, that if a defendant
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination (step one), and the
prosecutor offers race-neutral reasons (step two), then the judge must decide
whether the defendant has met his burden of showing purposeful
discrimination (step three).243 If the trial judge finds that the defendant has
met his burden, then the trial court will have to decide on an appropriate
remedy. The Batson Court, in a footnote that constituted its only discussion
of the appropriate remedy, 2" said that it would "make no attempt to instruct
these courts how best to implement our holding today."245 In the same
footnote, it suggested two possibilities-reinstate the improperly excluded
juror or discharge the entire venire and select a petit jury from a new onebut it "express[ed] no view" as to which of these remedies a lower court
should impose.246 These two remedies could well be seen as establishing a
floor, but not a ceiling for the appropriate remedy when there is a finding of
a Batson violation. 247 According to one commentator, 248 when Batson
remedies are interpreted through the lens of Danforthv. Minnesota,2 49 states
must provide a remedy that corrects for the constitutional violation, but they
are free to provide even greater protection for their citizens by providing a
more stringent remedy than the Court had suggested, if they so choose.25 0
Such an understanding could leave states free to opt for stronger sanctions
in appropriate cases.
Consistent with this view, the RJA provided a strong sanction for a
Batson violation: it took death off the table. It allowed defendants to
challenge their jury selection and sentence, and if they could show that race
was a "significant factor," then their death sentence would be reduced to life
sentences.html [https://perma.cc/3LYH-SSHQ] ("The Racial Justice Act allows death row inmates to
seek to have their sentences changed to life without parole if they can show that race was 'a significant
factor' in sentencing.").
243
244

See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986).
See Jason Mazzone, Batson Remedies, 97 IOWA L. REv. 1613, 1617 (2012) ("The Batson Court

addressed remedies for the constitutional violation it identified in just one place in its opinion, in footnote
twenty-four.").
245 Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24; see O'Brien & Grosso, supra note 9, at 1635 (noting that Batson

did not provide a specific remedy).
246 Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24.
247 Mazzone, supra note 244, at 1629.
24
1 Id. at 1628-29.
249

Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008).

250 In Danforth v. Minnesota, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, explained: "[T]he remedy a
state court chooses to provide its citizens for violations of the Federal Constitution is primarily a question
of state law. Federal law simply 'sets certain minimum requirements that States must meet but may

exceed in providing appropriate relief.' Danforth, 552 U.S. at 288 (quoting Am. Trucking Ass'ns v.
Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 178-79 (1990) (plurality opinion)). Although Danforth involved the retroactivity
standard for a new rule, and not peremptory challenges, the case makes clear that state courts-though
they cannot set standards for "determining whether a federal constitutional violation had occurred"-can
"provide a remedy beyond that available in federal court." Mazzone, supranote 244, at 1628.
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without parole or they would have death removed as a potential
punishment.2 5 1
In the Batson hearing in Foster, the prosecutors made clear that they
were focused on the death penalty. As they selected jurors, they kept in mind
that they sought the death penalty and they wanted jurors who were willing
to apply the death penalty. As one prosecutor explained: "So my whole
objective in striking eighty percent women and two men were their views on
death penalty and their relationship to their environment and the
defendant."252 If prosecutors are focused on securing the death penalty in
particular cases, and if the death penalty can be lost through race-based jury
selection, then prosecutors have a powerful incentive to avoid engaging in
race-based jury selection in death penalty cases.
In the first application of the RJA, the North Carolina court found that
race was a significant factor in the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory
challenges.253 The defendant, Marcus Robinson, was resentenced to life
imprisonment without parole.254 Three other defendants who challenged the
jury selection and sentencing in their cases also had their death sentences
vacated.255 The message to prosecutors was a powerful one: if prosecutors
engaged in race-based jury selection to ensure the death penalty in particular
cases, they would find their efforts thwarted. Thus, the RJA provided an
incentive for prosecutors to forgo discriminatory peremptories in capital
cases.
Although the RJA was only in effect for about four years,256 one
academic study of the first seven cases brought under the statute found that
"while black eligible venire members were struck consistently more than
those of other races, this disparity was significantly less after the passage of
the RJA."257 The authors found that this pattern held true for white
defendants, but not for black defendants.25 8 When prosecutors faced black
defendants, they continued to strike black prospective jurors at an even
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2011(g) (2012).
Batson Hearing Transcript, supra note 33, at 57.
253 O'Brien & Grosso, supra note 9, at 1635.
254 Order Granting Motion for Appropriate Relief
at 44-46, 166-67, North Carolina v. Robinson,
367 N.C. 232 (2013) (No. 91 CRS 23143), http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/marcusrobinson_order.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TA25-LUTL]. According to one report, the judge "commuted Marcus Robinson's
death sentence to life in prison without the possibility of parole after finding that race played a 'persistent,
pervasive and distorting role' in jury selection." Michael Hewitt, Prosecutors Will Learn How to Fight
RacialJustice Act, WINSTON-SALEM J., May 17, 2012, at 2.
255 O'Brien & Grosso, supra note
9, at 1635.
25" The RJA took effect on August 11, 2009. See Press
Release, Ctr. for Death Penalty Litig. Inc.,
NC Racial Justice Act: First Five Death Row Defendants File Motions Citing Strong Evidence of Racial
Bias (Aug. 3, 2010). Its repeal took effect on June 19, 2013.
257 O'Brien & Grosso, supra note 9, at 1640.
258 Id. at 1642-43.
251

252
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higher rate post-RJA than they had pre-RJA. 25 9 Thus, it is uncertain whether
the RJA, had it remained in effect,26 0 would have changed prosecutors'
behavior over time, though the authors remained optimistic that it would.
They suggested that the RJA, by highlighting statistical and other evidence
about the peremptory challenge process across cases and over time, would
make prosecutors feel more accountable than the Batson regime, which tried
to make prosecutors feel responsible for their individual peremptory strikes
but only made them feel defensive.2 61 In addition, the RJA had succeeded in
bringing the issue of race and its effects on the criminal justice system to the
foreground in North Carolina,262 and some psychologists have found, at least
in mock jury trials, that when race becomes salient, it can reduce racial
bias.263
B. ProvidingAdditional Tools
The other way the RJA tried to eliminate race-based peremptories was
by permitting defendants to show that race had been "a significant factor" in
jury selection or sentencing, and by allowing them to rely on evidence from
their own case, as well as statistical, documentary, or anecdotal evidence
drawn from the county, prosecutorial district, Superior Court division, or the
state, though the geographical scope was eventually limited to evidence from
the county or prosecutorial district.2 " Statistical evidence can show patterns
that are not apparent from a single case. For example, the RJA study was
able to show a reduction in race-based peremptories in post-RJA cases, even
26 5
though the effect was most pronounced in cases with white defendants.
Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized the roles that "historical evidence,"
widespread "practices," and "a culture of discrimination" found in some
district attorneys' offices played, and explained that these patterns and
practices should provide a context for assessing whether reasons given by
266
Justice
prosecutors to justify their peremptory strikes were pretextual.
Kennedy, writing for the Court in Miller-El v. Cockrell, explained: "This
evidence, of course, is relevant to the extent it casts doubt on the legitimacy
25 9

See id at 1643.

260

See supra note 241 (describing the RJA's amendments and repeal).

261 See O'Brien & Grosso, supra note 9, at 1644-45.
262

Id. at 1644.

263 See. e.g., Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions of
Guilt and DispositionalAttributions, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1367, 1376-78 (2000)
[hereinafter Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom];Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth,
White JurorBias: An Investigation of PrejudiceAgainst Black Defendants in the American Courtroom,

7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 201, 221 (2001) [hereinafter Sommers & Ellsworth, White JurorBias].
264 Compare 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 464, § 15A-201 1(b)(2) (2009) (codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-201 1(b)(2) (2012)), with 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 136, § 15A-201 1(c) (2012).
265 See O'Brien & Grosso, supra note 9, at 1653.
266

Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 346-47 (2003).
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of the motives underlying the State's actions in petitioner's case."267
Unfortunately, North Carolina's experiment with the RJA-"the only
one of its kind in the country" 2 6 8-was limited to just four years. In 2013,
the State House of Representatives voted to repeal it, followed by the State
Senate. 269 The bill repealing the RJA was signed into law by Governor Pat
McCrory, a Republican. 2 70 The RJA had passed in 2009, at a time when there
was a Democrat in the Governor's Office in North Carolina and the state
legislature had not been as heavily controlled by Republicans as it was just
a few years later.27' Opponents viewed the RJA as legislation that clogged
the courts, denied justice to victims of violent crimes, and tried to end the
death penalty in North Carolina,2 7 2 whereas defenders of the RJA regarded
it as legislation that allowed the state to "face up to [its] history and [to]
make sure it's not repeated." 2 73
If the Court were to follow North Carolina's lead and provide a stringent
remedy in capital cases involving Batson violations, it might deter
prosecutors from engaging in race-based peremptory challenges because
death would be off the table. Of course, it might not deter bad behavior, as
the North Carolina experiment was brief and left open the question whether
prosecutors would change their behavior when the defendant was African
American.

267

Id. at 347.

268 Kim Severson, North Carolina Repeals Law Allowing Racial Bias Claim in
Death Penalty

Challenges, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/06/us/racial-justice-act-

repealed-in-north-carolina.html [https://perma.cc/JL43-3W6N]. The Center for Death Penalty Litigation
Inc., which also described North Carolina as "the first state to undertake a comprehensive effort to sever
the historical ties between race and the death penalty" with passage of the RJA, also noted that Kentucky
was "the only other state with similar, but less comprehensive, legislation." See Press Release, supra note

256.
269 Mark Binker, Racial Justice Act Repeal Headed to the Governor, WRAL (June 12, 2013),
http://www.wral.com/racial-justice-act-repeal-headed-to-the-governor/12547009/
[https://perma.cc/

F868-QVET]; Laura Leslie, House Votes to Roll Back Racial Justice Act, WRAL (June 4, 2013),
www.wral.com/house-votes-to-roll-back-racial-justice-act-/12516075/ [https://perma.cc/CJ8J-7XKC].
270 Matt Smith, 'Racial Justice Act' Repealed in North Carolina, CNN (June 21, 3013, 3:48 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/20/justice/north-carolina-death-penalty/ [https://perma.cc/7EMA-TGRQ].
271 Id
272 See, e.g., Scott Sexton, Many of the State's DAs Oppose Racial Justice Act, WINSTON-SALEM
J., July 30, 2009, at 1-2 (describing district attorneys' concern that the bill would end the death penalty

in N.C.).
273 Severson, supra note 268 (quoting Rep. Rick Glazier, a Democrat).
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V. ELIMINATING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

Although the Supreme Court could provide specific remedies as a means
of curbing Batson violations, the most effective remedy, as Justice Marshall
suggested thirty years ago, is the elimination of the peremptory challenge.274
In the thirty years since Batson, lawyers have continued to exercise
peremptories based upon a prospective juror's race.275 The Batson three-step
test has been unable to stop this practice. Moreover, Batson has been most
ineffective when it matters the most: in capital cases, such as Foster, when
the defendant's life is at stake. 27 6
It is time, after thirty years of Batson,2 77 to return to Justice Marshall's
prescient observation: "The decision [in Batson] will not end the racial
discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That
goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges
entirely." 27 8 Thirty years of experience with Batson supports the wisdom of
his claim. If a discriminatory peremptory is a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, as the Court has said it is, 2 79 then peremptories, which are
part of the American jury tradition, but which are not protected by the
Constitution,280 must give way in light of a constitutional violation. Justice
Marshall urged the Court to go further than the test it devised in Batson and
281
Thirty
to "fashion[] a remedy adequate to eliminate that discrimination."
years ago Justice Marshall identified that remedy as the elimination of the
peremptory challenge and it is time to heed his words.282 The Court did not
use Foster in this way, even though it presented a good opportunity. There
Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Gender-based peremptories were not prohibited until 1994 in J.E.B. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (holding that gender-based peremptories violate the Equal Protection
274
275

Clause).
276 See, e.g., EJI REPORT, supranote 213, at 5 ("Racially biased use of peremptory strikes and illegal
racial discrimination in jury selection remains widespread, particularly in serious criminal cases and
capital cases."); Chalmers, supra note 227, at 6, 7 ("In death penalty cases from 2005 to 2009 in one
Alabama county, prosecutors used peremptory strikes to remove 80 percent of the qualified African
Americans in the jury venires, according to the [EJI] report.").
2" The Court waited only a little over twenty years from its opinion in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.

202 (1965) to its opinion in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) to revise the evidentiary burden that
it had established in Swain. Thirty years seems more than an adequate period of time in which to test the
Batson framework and to conclude that it has failed to eliminate discriminatory peremptory challenges.
278 Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring).
279 Id. at 84 ("In Swain v. Alabama, this Court recognized that a 'State's purposeful or deliberate
denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the administration of justice violated
the Equal Protection Clause.' . . . This principle has been 'consistently and repeatedly' reaffirmed,. . . in

numerous decisions of this Court both preceding and following Swain. We reaffirm this principle today.")
(internal citations omitted).
280 Id. at 91 ("While the Constitution does not confer a right to peremptory challenges, ... those
challenges traditionally have been viewed as one means of assuring the selection of a qualified and
unbiased jury.") (internal citation omitted).
211 Id. at 105.
282

Id. at 102-03.
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are few Batson challenges that will come as close to having a "smoking gun"
as Fosterdid, but there will be others. Fosterwas a missed opportunity, but
it will not be the Court's only opportunity to heed Justice Marshall's wise
counsel.
A.

Why Batson is so Ineffective
1.

Forgedas a Compromise

Batson was a compromise. It was an effort by the Justices to preserve
peremptory challenges while halting discriminatory peremptories. The
defining feature of a peremptory is that it allows a lawyer to remove a
prospective juror from the venire without giving any reason at all. Batson
tried to create a test that would allow trial judges to discern which
peremptories were discriminatory without requiring lawyers to give reasons
for all peremptories. If reasons always had to be given, then the peremptory
would no longer be a peremptory, but a challenge for cause. The three-step
Batson test provided a structure to help the trial judge figure out which
peremptories would require reasons and then the trial judge would determine
which reasons were race neutral and which were discriminatory. 283 The
peremptory would be allowed in the former instance but not in the latter.
The compromise assumed that prosecutors would give the actual reasons
for their peremptories and that judges would be able to distinguish
permissible from impermissible reasons. With the traditional peremptory,
lawyers did not have to articulate a reason. The traditional peremptory could
be exercised for any reason or no reason at all. However, with Batson,
prosecutors, when challenged, had to identify reasons and defendants had to
establish that the prosecutors' reasons were pretextual. The three-part test
satisfied neither defendants nor prosecutors. Prosecutors did not want to give
reasons for their peremptories, and defendants found it difficult to prove
prosecutors' purposeful discrimination. Trial judges were left in the
middle-in the difficult position of having to determine whether
prosecutors' reasons were pretextual after they had given seemingly neutral
reasons. 2 84 Thus, Batson, like most compromises, satisfied no one. Its twin
goals-to maintain peremptories and to eliminate discriminatory
peremptories-were laudable, but incompatible.

283 See supra notes

111-16.

284 Chief Justice Burger, writing in dissent in Batson, recognized the difficulties that trial judges

would face in implementing Batson: "I join my colleagues in wishing the Nation's judges well as they
struggle to grasp how to implement today's holding. To my mind, however, attention to these
'implementation' questions leads quickly to the conclusion that there is no 'good' way to implement the
holding, let alone a 'best' way." Batson, 476 U.S. at 131.
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Easy to Evade

One reason the Batson test was unable to stop discriminatory
peremptories was because it was easy for prosecutors, and later all other
lawyers, 285 to give seemingly neutral reasons for the exercise of a
peremptory. The reasons, which according to Batson,28 6 had to be "related
to the particular case to be tried," 28 7 proved easy to find. They could be just
about anything as long as they did not mention race, gender, or ethnicity. 288
Those were the only taboo words, and lawyers quickly learned to avoid
them.289 They might even have believed that they were not relying on these
characteristics when they exercised their peremptories. As Justice Marshall
observed: "[I]t is even possible that an attorney may lie to himself in an effort
to convince himself that his motives are legal." 29 0 An attorney might even
be unaware that he or she holds such biases, which have been described as
implicit biases that "operate outside of conscious awareness. "291
As long as lawyers stayed clear of mentioning race, gender, or ethnicity
as reasons for peremptories, trial judges usually accepted the reasons
lawyers gave. To show how easy it was to produce seemingly neutral reasons
to explain one's peremptories, one Illinois judge compiled a list of reasons
Explanations' or '20
that he facetiously entitled "'Handy Race-Neutral
29 2
Time-Tested Race-Neutral Explanations."'
Lawyers' reasons for a peremptory became even easier to provide after
the Court in Purkett v. Elem 29 3 loosened the standard it had established in
Batson. In Batson, the Court had tried to strike an appropriate balance and
had instructed prosecutors that they could not rely on intuition, hunch, or
just an assertion as a basis for a peremptory; rather, they had to provide a
reason "related to the particular case to be tried," 294 though the reason did

285 The Batson progeny made the Batson test applicable to all lawyers (prosecutors and defense
attorneys in criminal cases and all attorneys in civil cases). See supra notes 4-7 (describing the Batson

progeny).
286
Batson, 476 U.S. at 79.
287 Id. at 98.
288 See supra notes 4-7 (identifying the Batson progeny that expanded the reach of Batson).
289

United States v. Omoruyi, 7 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 1993), offers a good example of lawyers in the

process of learning which words to avoid and which ones they could still use. At the time of Omoruyi,
race was an unacceptable reason for a peremptory, but gender was still permissible. Accordingly, the
prosecutor explained that he exercised his peremptory against an African-American female prospective
juror because of her gender, not her race. Id. at 881.
290

Batson, 476 U.S at 106 (quoting King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493, 502 (E.D.N.Y.

&

1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
291 Mark W. Bennett, Unravelingthe GordianKnot ofImplicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems
ofJudge-DominatedVoir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L.
POL'Y REV. 149, 152 (2010).
292
293
294

People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 65-66 (111. App. Ct. 1996).
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768-70 (1995).
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
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not have to rise to the level of a for cause challenge.2 95 In Purkett v. Elem,29 6
the Court backed away from the requirement that the reason had to be related
to the case. After Elem, the reasons could be "silly" or "fanciful," at least at
step two of the Batson test, and the Court reasoned that if a lawyer gave such
silly reasons at step two, then at step three the judge had to consider whether
those silly reasons were pretextual.297 The difficulty is that the reasons
simply have to be race neutral; it no longer matters if they are silly or
irrelevant. Thus, the lawyer's reasons for striking two African-American
prospective jurors in Elem, including the way one prospective juror wore his
hair ("long curly hair") and the kind of facial hair another sported ("a
mustache and goatee type beard") became acceptable reasons even if they
had nothing to do with the case. 2 98 In the past, I have described reason-giving
under Batson as a "charade" and reason-giving under Elem as a "farce."299
Both standards were sufficiently lax that almost any reason would do."* As
a result, the integrity of jury selection was undermined.
3.

Difficult to Review

Another reason that Batson was unable to stop discriminatory
peremptories was that while trial judges might be in the best position to
determine whether a reason is pretextual or not, it remains an impossible
task to perform. If trial judges questioned the reasons, they would impugn
the integrity of prosecutors and other lawyers. They would essentially be
calling them liars or racists,30 1 and not surprisingly, trial judges were
reluctant to do this. Appellate judges, with only a transcript before them, had
to defer to trial judges' factual and credibility findings. Prosecutors gave
seemingly neutral reasons and trial judges accepted them. Appellate judges,
who were not in the courtroom and did not see the jurors or the attorneys
before them, had little choice but to defer to the trial judge's rulings. As the
Seventh Circuit explained, it would not disturb such factual findings unless
they were "completely outlandish" or there was other evidence that indicated
the "falsity" of the findings. 302
at 97.
Elem, 514 U.S. at 768-69.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 766 (quoting the prosecutor) (internal quotation marks omitted).

295 Id.
296

297
298

299 Marder, Batson Revisited, supra note 9, at 1595.

" However, when a lawyer gives one explanation for striking an African-American prospective
juror, but does not exercise a strike against a white prospective juror to whom that same reason applies,

then a court is more willing to find that the reason is pretextual. See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S.
472,483-84 (2008).
301 Transcript of Hearing on Motion for New Trial, supra note 29, at 95 (quoting Prosecutor Pullen).
302 Tinner v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 308 F.3d 697, 703 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v.
Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir.), and modified, 136 F.3d 1115 (1998)).
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With thirty years of Batson experience, it is easy to look back and to see
that there are many weaknesses inherent in the approach the Court devised
in Batson. It is easy for prosecutors to provide seemingly neutral reasons and
it is hard for defendants to show underlying discriminatory intent. Trial
judges are put in the difficult position of trying to judge those reasons and
to determine which are pretextual and which are not when most of the
reasons appear neutral on the surface. Trial judges have been told to make
credibility determinations,30 3 but there is a tendency to find lawyers, who are
officers of the court and who appear day after day in the courtroom, to be
credible. Appellate judges are put in the difficult position of trying to assess
what was seen and heard in the courtroom without actually having been
there; thus, they defer to the trial judge's determination.
The problems with Batson are structural and mere tweaks are unlikely
to resolve them, which is why the only adequate remedy is to eliminate the
peremptory challenge. We now have thirty years of experience with Batson
and it is time to acknowledge that Batson has not solved the problem. of
discriminatory peremptories.
B.

Why DiscriminatoryPeremptoriesare so Harmful

The Batson Court recognized that discriminatory peremptory challenges
harm the defendant, the excluded juror, and the community."* A
discriminatory peremptory harms the defendant because he is denied a fair
trial.305 As he watches prospective jurors struck from the jury because of
their race, he loses faith in the jury that will hear his case and in the entire
criminal justice system. A discriminatory peremptory also harms the
excluded juror, who is excluded simply because of his race.36 A
discriminatory peremptory conveys a message of inferiority and secondclass citizenship to the excluded juror.3 07 Finally, a discriminatory
peremptory harms the community at large, which begins to question the
integrity and fairness of the trial.308 The Court in Batson identified all three
of these harms, and later opinions, such as Powers v. Ohio,309 elaborated on
the nature of these harms and how they threatened the fairness of the jury
trial.3 10
These multiple harms are particularly pronounced in capital cases, such

303 See, e.g., id.
3

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1986).

305 Id. at 86.
306
30

Id. at 87.
See, e.g., EJI REPORT, supranote 213, at 28-30 (describing the stigma that prospective African-

American prospective jurors felt when they were struck from the jury).
30s Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
309

310

499 U.S. 400 (1991).
Id. at 402.
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as Foster. Although the peremptory challenge might have been traditionally
seen as a protection for the criminal defendant, that has not been the case
particularly for African-American defendants in capital cases in the South.
In case after case, and Foster was no exception as the Court has now
recognized, prosecutors use peremptories to keep African Americans from
serving on the jury so that African-American defendants are tried by allwhite or almost all-white juries.3 1 ' According to a 2010 report by the Equal
JusticeInitiative, from 2005 to 2009, prosecutors in one county in Alabama
used peremptory strikes to remove eighty percent of qualified AfricanAmerican prospective jurors. 3 12 When prosecutors use their strikes in this
manner, the defendant can raise a Batson challenge, but the chance of
success is slight. That same report found that Tennessee's "appellate courts
have never granted Batson relief in a criminal case"313 and that "no criminal
defendant has won a Batson challenge in [South Carolina] since 1992."314
1.

Harms to the Defendant

When prosecutors use race-based peremptories, particularly in capital
cases, they harm defendants in multiple ways. The defendant watches as one
prospective African-American juror after another is struck by the prosecutor,
until the defendant is left with an all-white jury. The defendant might
question not only whether the jury will understand his perspective, but also
whether these jurors will be fair and impartial. He might fear that they are
biased, and that there are no jurors remaining who will inhibit racial bias
from playing a role during deliberations.3 15
Another harm to the defendant is that he will be tried by a jury that has
a limited range of perspectives available to it. Not only have prospective
jurors been removed for cause if they are unalterably opposed to the death
penalty "'-and this tends to have a disproportionate effect on African

"1 EJ REPORT, supra note 213, at 5, 14.
311

Id.; Chalmers, supranote 227, at 7 (citing ER REPORT).

313 EJI REPORT, supra note 213, at 19.
314
Id. at 27.
3 When African Americans are on ajury, they might challenge statements by white jurors that are

based on stereotype. Two psychologists have found that the presence of African Americans on a jury
leads white jurors to spend more time discussing race and how it might affect the case. See, e.g., Sommers
& Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supranote 263, at 1376; Sommers & Ellsworth, White JurorBias,
supra note 263, at 220).
316 A "death qualified" jury is one in which jurors who are staunchly opposed to the death penalty

have been removed for cause. If they say they can consider applying the death penalty, then they can be
seated as jurors. If they say they could never apply the death penalty, then they will be removed for cause.
The Supreme Court has held that death qualification does not violate the fair cross-section requirement

of the Sixth Amendment. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176-78 (1986).
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Americans" 7-but also African-American prospective jurors have been
removed through the prosecutor's use of discriminatory peremptory
challenges, thus leaving very few African Americans, if any, on the jury.
Although a defendant is not entitled to have a petit jury of any particular
mix,318 he is entitled to have a jury from which prospective jurors have not
been struck because of race. In particular, an African-American defendant
in a capital case might worry that those who remain on the jury, after death
qualification and the prosecutor's exercise of peremptories, are less likely to
include jurors who are willing to analyze the government's case carefully.
The defendant also might feel helpless as he watches the prosecutor
exercise discriminatory peremptories because he knows there is little he can
do to remedy the situation. He can raise a Batson challenge, but if he is being
tried in a state such as South Carolina, in which Batson challenges have not
been granted in over twenty years," then he knows that the trial judge will
not grant his challenge. Many defendants in such states do not even bother
320
to raise Batson challenges, knowing that trial judges never grant them.
Even if the defendant raises a Batson challenge and preserves it for appeal,
the appellate court will treat the trial judge's determination with
deference, 3 2 1as will the habeas court. Thus, the defendant can raise a Batson
challenge and hope that it will eventually be considered by the U.S. Supreme
322
Court, but since the Court hears only a limited number of cases each Term,
this hope has little chance of being realized.
The prosecutor's discriminatory peremptory also harms the defendant in
another way: it is an act taken by a government official, which casts doubt
on the rest of the trial and raises the question whether other official actorsfrom the judge, to the witnesses, to the jurors-will act in good faith. One
of the features of American society under Jim Crow was not just that white
citizens treated African Americans as second-class citizens, but also that
white officials treated African Americans in this manner.323 When the
"'See, e.g., Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control. Death

Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 46 (1984) (finding that death-qualified
juries are more likely to exclude women and African Americans).
318

See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,538 (1975) ("It should also be emphasized that in holding

that petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community we impose no
requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive

groups in the population.").
3

See, e.g., EJ REPORT, supra note 213, at 27 (reporting that no criminal defendant has won a

Batson challenge in South Carolina since 1992).
320 Conversation with Stephen Bright, in Iowa City, Iowa (Oct. 20,2011) (notes on file with author).
321 Tennessee is an extreme example. Its appellate courts have "never reversed a criminal conviction
because of racial discrimination." EJI REPORT, supra note 213, at 22.
322 For example, the Supreme Court heard seventy-six cases in the 2014 Term. 2014 Term Opinions
opinions/slipopinion/14
ofthe Court, SUPREME CT. OF THE U.S., http://www.suprcmecourt.gov/

[https://perma.cc/ST3B-4UAN].
323 See, e.g., GILBERT KING, DEVIL IN THE GROVE: THURGOOD MARSHALL, THE GROVELAND

BOYS, AND THE DAWN OF A NEW AMERICA (2012) (recounting the plight of the "Groveland boys," four
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sheriff, the prosecutor, and the judge were all suspect, African Americans
could not depend on the law to protect them.324 While the system of Jim
Crow has been dismantled and African Americans have secured-at least in
theory if not in practice 32 5 -the full rights of citizenship including jury
service, discriminatory peremptories are a vestige of this earlier era. Jim
Crow laws and practices once prevented African Americans from enjoying
full citizenship including the right to serve as jurors and the right to be tried
by juries in which members of their race had not been excluded.3 2 6 However,
even after statutes prohibiting African-American men from serving on juries
were held to be unconstitutional,32 7 as were discriminatory peremptories,3 28
that did not mean that African Americans actually served on juries.
Finally, discriminatory peremptories in a capital case, such as Foster,
pose a grave danger because a defendant's life is at stake. A capital jury
makes a judgment not only about guilt or innocence, but also about
sentencing. Thus, it is imperative that the jury is selected in a manner that is
fair. A prosecutor's discriminatory peremptories make it look like the
process is rigged even before the trial has begun. Although prosecutors want
to win, they cannot put winning above playing by the rules. They need to
choose cases that are strong enough to proceed without having to use
discriminatory peremptories to improve their chances.
2.

Harms to Excluded Jurors

As Batson and the Batson progeny recognized, discriminatory
peremptories harm the excluded jurors, in addition to the defendant.3 29
African-American men and all women were originally excluded from jury
service. State statutes kept African-American men from serving on juries
until 1880 when the Court held in Strauder v. West Virginia that such
statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
African-American young men in Florida who were accused of raping a white woman in 1949; two were
murdered even before the case went to trial, a third was murdered while being transferred by the sheriff
from one prison to another, and the fourth barely survived that same transfer).
324 In the case of the Groveland boys, the law not only failed to protect them, but law enforcement
took matters into its own hands. According to King's account, the sheriff was responsible for the murder
of one young man and the attempted murder of another; however, the sheriff was never brought to justice.

Id. at 253-57.
325 But see infra notes 346-50 and accompanying text describing racial profiling, police brutality,
and unequal sentencing.
326 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A BriefHistory ofthe Criminal Jury in the

UnitedStates, 61 U. CI. L. REv. 867, 894-96 (1994).
327 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,
305 (1880).
328 See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203-04
(1965).
329 See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 ("As long ago as Strauder,therefore,
the Court recognized that
by denying a person participation in jury service on account of his race, the State unconstitutionally
discriminated against the excluded juror.").
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Amendment.33 o Women did not uniformly have the right to serve as jurors
in federal court until the Civil Rights Act of 1957.331 Even then, some states,
such as Florida33 2 and Louisiana,33 3 maintained practices, such as affirmative
registration, that kept women from actually being called for jury duty. A
woman had to take the additional step of going to the courthouse and
registering for jury service in order to be called to serve.334 It was not until
335
that affirmative
1975, when the Court held in Taylor v. Louisiana
registration for women violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a
venire drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, that women could
be called to serve in equal numbers as men.336 Thus, discriminatory
peremptories, which keep African-American men and all women from
serving on juries, need to be understood in light of a history of exclusion.
Although many citizens who receive a jury summons see it only as an
inconvenience to be avoided,337 many others, especially those who have
been historically excluded from jury service, regard it as a badge of full
citizenship. They feel pride in receiving a summons and in going down to
the courthouse in order to serve as a juror. As one African-American man,
Mr. Cox, a sanitation worker, explained:
[It was] one of the proudest moments of my life. Ever since I
was a little kid .

.

. I've had a desire to serve.

. .

. I've read

many books on the jury and when I was first called to serve I
went to the library and read up on the jury system and what a
fine institution it is... . When I got my summons ...

I got a

Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305, 312.
Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended in relevant part
at 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012)). Different states permitted women to serve as jurors at different points. If a
330

331

state permitted women to serve in state court as jurors, then they were also permitted to serve in federal
court in that state. For an account of early state practices with respect to women and African-American
men as jurors, see Nancy S. Marder, The ChangingComposition of the American Jury, in THEN & Now:
STORIES OF LAW AND PROGRESS 66-74 (Lori Andrews & Sarah Harding eds., 2013).
332

See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 65 (1961) (holding that Florida's practice of requiring

affirmative registration for women who wanted to be called forjury service did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment).
333 Louisiana was one of the last states to maintain the practice ofaffirmative registration. The U.S.

Supreme Court held the practice unconstitutional in 1975. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 525 (1975).
The Louisiana legislature had already repealed the provision on January 1, 1975, but that did not affect

Taylor's conviction. Id at 523 n.2.
334 Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 60-61.
3 419 U.S. at 522.
336 Id. at 525.

3 See, e.g., ROBERT G. BOATRIGHT, IMPROVING CITIZEN RESPONSE TO JURY SUMMONSES: A
REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS ix-x (1998) (identifying reasons why citizens did not respond to their
jury summons and suggesting reforms that would make them more inclined to respond); Susan Carol
Losh et al., "Reluctant Jurors": What Summons Responses Reveal About Jury Duty Attitudes, 83

JUDICATURE 304, 310 (2000) (finding that citizens who can reschedule their jury duty for a convenient
time feel more enthusiastic about their service than citizens who appear when they are told to appear; the
most dissatisfied citizens are those who sought an excuse but were denied one).
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sense of really belonging to the American community. 338
Against this backdrop, discriminatory peremptories are an affront to the
African-American man or to any woman who has been called to serve but
who is now being kept from service "on account of race" 339 or gender.
Whereas the summons serves as a badge of full citizenship, the
discriminatory peremptory is a reminder that African-American men and all
women were once second-class citizens and that they have not fully
overcome that inferior status. The lawyer who exercises a discriminatory
strike is judging them to be unsuitable for the particular case, not on the basis
of any individual characteristic, but solely on the grounds of group
membership.
The visibility of race and gender, unlike many other characteristics,
means that everyone in the courtroom is aware that the excluded juror is
being struck because of race or gender. For example, when one African
American after another is struck by a lawyer exercising a peremptory
challenge, it is clear to those in the courtroom that these prospective jurors
are being removed because of their race. Even if all the peremptory strikes
are exercised at once, rather than one at a time, as was the case in Foster, it
is still apparent when an all-white jury is seated that the prosecutor has used
his peremptories to remove all of the African-American prospective jurors
because of their race.
A juror excluded by a discriminatory peremptory is likely to experience
a range of feelings and they are likely to be negative ones. He might feel
stigmatized that he is being judged deficient because of his race, or angry
that he is still not being treated as a full citizen, or annoyed that he has been
summoned to the courthouse and has taken time away from work only to
find that his race is being used against him. Mr. Cox described how he felt
as follows: "I was excused seemingly just because my skin was black. There
was no other reason why I should have been challenged. I was very irritated
and extremely disappointed that such a practice should be allowed." 340
Typically, judges explain that peremptories are part of the selection
process and that they do not mean that the prospective juror cannot serve but
only that they cannot serve in that particular case.34 1 Judges also tell
excluded jurors not to take their exclusion personally, and most try to follow
. Dale W. Broeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 DUKE L.J. 19, 26. For more recent accounts of the
harm suffered by excluded jurors, see EJI REPORT, supra note 213, at 28-34.
39 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (describing the "core guarantee of equal protection"
as "ensuring citizens that their State will not discriminate on account of race").
3o

Broeder, supra note 338, at 28 (internal quotation marks omitted).

See, e.g., Trial Transcript at 38, United States v. Torres, No. 77 Cr. 680 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1980)
[hereinafter Trial Transcript] ("If I excuse you, it doesn't mean that I think you are a bad juror .... ")
(quoting Federal District Court Judge Whitman Knapp).
341
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the judge's words.342 However, it is hard to accept that a discriminatory
peremptory is part of the selection process and jurors excluded on this basis
are likely to leave the courthouse feeling dissatisfied with their jury
experience.
3. Harms to the Community
When discriminatory peremptories are used during jury selection, the
larger community is likely to question the fairness of the entire trial and the
verdict that is ultimately reached. This questioning is likely to be even more
pronounced in a capital case when the jury is speaking on behalf of the
community and is rendering a judgment and death sentence in the name of
the community. For communities to accept a verdict, even when they
disagree with it, they have to believe that the process was fair.3
Discriminatory peremptories call into question the fairness of the process.
A jury trial begins with jury selection. This means that discriminatory
peremptories can make the entire trial open to question. The selection of
jurors is a critical part of the trial. As Justice Kennedy described the harm to
the community in Powers v. Ohio: "The composition of the trier of fact itself
is called in question, and the irregularity may pervade all the proceedings
that follow." 3 " If peremptories are exercised in a discriminatory manner,
then it appears that the deck is being stacked against the defendant. The jury
in a criminal trial stands as a buffer between the individual defendant and
the powerful government, including the "corrupt or overzealous prosecutor"
or the "compliant, biased, or eccentric judge"; 345 it will be unable to play this
key role if it is compromised from the start.
When a community is already distrustful of the criminal justice system,
discriminatory peremptories only add to that distrust. If a community
includes African Americans, and yet discriminatory peremptories are used
by the prosecutor to strike the few African-American prospective jurors
from the venire, leaving an all-white jury, it will be hard for African
Americans in that community to accept that the process was fair and that the
verdict is legitimate. Instead, the practice contributes to widespread
skepticism about the fairness of the criminal justice system.
C. EnvisioningJury Selection Without Peremptory Challenges
If peremptory challenges were eliminated it would eliminate one
342 See Mary R. Rose, A Voir Dire of Voir Dire: Listening to Jurors' Views Regarding the

Peremptory Challenge, 78 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1061, 1097 (2003) ("Jurors seemed to realize that jury
selection is only partly about them.").
343 Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT'L J. PSYCHOL. 117, 119-20

(2000).
3 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412-13 (1991).
345 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
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potential source of discrimination during a trial. Unfortunately, there are
many areas of American society that are still marked by discrimination, and
the criminal justice system is no exception. 3 ' There have been longstanding
complaints about police practices that include stopping and frisking AfricanAmerican men far more often than whiteS347 and sentencing them to longer
prison terms than whites for similar crimes. 348 Headlines have been filled
with incidents in which young African-American men have been killed by
police, 3 49 sparking protests around the country. 35 0 Although there are many
" See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the CriminalJustice

System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 690-91 (1995) (describing the criminal justice system as racist).
3 See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land:
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious

Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1076 (2010) (calling for rebellious lawyering to root out racial profiling
by modern law enforcement).
m See, e.g., Celesta A. Albonetti, Sentencing Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines:Effects of
Defendant Characteristics,Guilty Pleas andDepartureson Sentence Outcomesfor Drug Offenses 19911992, 31 LAW & Soc'y REv. 789, 816-17 (1997) (finding that black drug offenders received harsher
punishments than similarly situated white defendants in federal court, even when taking into account
socioeconomic status, offense severity, criminal history, plea agreements, and sentencing guideline
departures); Traci Burch, Skin Color andthe CriminalJustice System: Beyond Black-White Disparities

in Sentencing, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 395, 413 (2015) (finding that "[o]n average, black firsttime offenders [in Georgia] receive higher incarceration sentences than whites regardless of crime type

... [and] blacks of darker skin tones receive longer incarceration sentences than both whites and lightskinned blacks after taking facts about the crime and demographic variables into account").
' See, e.g., Mark Berman & Wesley Lowery, FergusonPoliceSay Michael Brown Was a Robbery

Suspect, Identify Darren Wilson as Officer Who Shot Him, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/08/15/ferguson-police-releasing-name-ofofficer-who-shot-michael-brown/ [https://perma.cc/59NZ-JP7E] (describing the killing of Michael
Brown, an unarmed African-American teenager, by police officer Darren Brown); Lilly Fowler,
Community Pours Out to Support Brown Family at Church Rally: Police Shooting in Ferguson, ST.

LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 18, 2014, at A6 (describing Rev. Al Sharpton's speech at the Greater Grace
Church following the killing of Michael Brown by Darren Wilson, a Ferguson police officer).
350 See, e.g., Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests FlareAfter Ferguson Police Officer Is Not
Indicted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-darren-wilson-

shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html

[https://perma.cc/P8WV-VEWM]

(describing

riots

in

Ferguson, Missouri); David DeBolt et al., Oakland: Ferguson Protesters Storm Freeway, Loot Stores
and Battle Cops, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS
(Nov. 25, 2014,
11:38
AM),
http://www.mercurynews.com/2014/11/25/oakland-ferguson-protesters-storm-freeway-loot-stores-and-

battle-cops/ [https://perma.cc/U5ZS-A-LYZ] (describing protesters marching through Oakland, Calif.,
after a grand jury in Ferguson, Missouri decided not to indict Darren Wilson in the shooting death of
Michael Brown); Ferguson One Year Later: The People, Places and Ideas That Came to Prominence
Over the Past Year, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 9, 2015, at Al (describing how Trayvon Martin's

death in 2012 led to the hashtag "Black Lives Matter" and that after Michael Brown's death it "became
the rallying cry for fundamental changes in race relations in this country. The three words were shouted

during protests and marches in Ferguson and after police-involved shootings that followed across the
country."); David Hunn et al., No Charges for Wilson. Arson, Rioting Erupt in Ferguson: Ferguson
Decision: Federal Inquiries Continue, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 25, 2014, at Al (describing
protests in Missouri after the announcement that police officer Darren Wilson will not be charged in the

shooting death of Michael Brown).
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ways in which the criminal justice system is in need of reform, if peremptory
challenges were eliminated, there would be one less way that discrimination
could enter a trial.
1.

How Would It Work?

Jury selection without peremptory challenges would follow many of the
familiar steps, though it is likely to be quicker and more focused than our
current jury selection. A venire would still be brought into the courtroom.
Those prospective jurors who sought to be excused for hardship would still
be permitted to do so.351 A venire could be questioned as a whole, or twelve
jurors could be seated in the jury box, questioned, and replaced as needed,
depending on the practice of the court.
There would still be a voir dire, or questioning, of prospective jurors.
The voir dire might even be more extensive than the current practice, at least
in federal court, to allow lawyers and judges to identify prospective jurors
who should be removed for cause. However, the questioning would focus
on which prospective jurors need to be removed for cause. The voir dire
would also continue to educate prospective jurors about their role as jurors
and help them to make the transition from "reluctant citizens" to
"responsible jurors."352
Even in a system without peremptory challenges, for cause challenges
would continue to be granted; however, there are limited bases for such
challenges. Traditionally, for cause challenges are limited to prospective
jurors who have a familial connection to one of the participants in the trial,
who have a financial stake in the outcome of the trial, or who say that they
cannot be impartial.3 53 For cause challenges require that a reason is given,
that the reason is on the record, and that the judge decides whether the reason
fits into one of the limited categories appropriate for a for cause challenge.
If the venire is questioned as a whole, then after any prospective jurors who
need to be removed for cause have been removed, the bailiff would
randomly draw twelve names from the remaining prospective jurors and
they would serve as jurors.
Without peremptory challenges, it would be more difficult for the parties

.

3' See, e.g., Trial Transcript, supra note 341, at 47 ("[I]f any of you find [jury duty] unduly
burdensome to be as we call it sequestered, when your name is called just come up to me and tell me
what particular problem you have and I will see whether in my conscience I should let you go .

(quoting Judge Knapp).
352 Nancy S. Marder, Juror Bias, Voir Dire, and the Judge-Jury Relationship, 90 CHI.-KENT L.

REV. 927, 929 (2015); see id. at 939-42 (describing the transformation of citizens into jurors).
353 See Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 433 (1887). Judges might choose to grant more for cause
challenges once peremptory challenges are eliminated because they will not have the lawyers'
peremptory challenges to fall back on as they do now. However, for cause challenges will not cause the
same problems as peremptory challenges because they are available in only a limited number of
circumstances and a reason must always be given in open court and accepted by the judge.
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to discriminate against prospective jurors. Peremptory challenges open the
door to discrimination, and without peremptory challenges, that door would
remain closed. Jurors would be randomly selected from among the
prospective jurors who had remained after hardship excuses and for cause
challenges had been granted.
The jury that is seated without peremptory challenges is also more likely
to be diverse than ajury whose composition has been skewed by peremptory
challenges. England and Wales eliminated peremptory challenges and
limited stand-bys 354 so that their juries would reflect the heterogeneity of
their society.355 Both countries eliminated peremptory challenges," even
though they had long been part of their jury system. According to one
empirical study undertaken at the request of the Ministry of Justice, juries in
several locations still remain disproportionately white, though those
surveyed felt that the verdicts did not discriminate against blacks and other
minority defendants.357 A two-week study providing a snapshot view of
juries at the Old Bailey noted that the observed juries were diverse and that
jury selection was conducted far more quickly than in the United States.35 s
2. Judges Have Begun to Contemplate the Possibilityof No Peremptory
Challenges
Although peremptory challenges have always been part of the American
jury tradition, as they once were in England and Wales, some American
judges and Justices have become more open to the possibility of eliminating
them. The number of judges, though still small, is growing. Linda
Greenhouse, who covered the Supreme Court for The New York Times for
almost thirty years, noted this trend and observed that "[i]t only takes a

" Stand-bys allowed the Crown to reserve judgment on a prospective juror until all other
prospective jurors were considered. See John F. McEldowney, "Standby for the Crown ": An Historical
Analysis, 1979 CRIM. L. REV. 272, 280-81.
'5s See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Terrorism and Trialby Jury: The Vices and Virtues of British and

American CriminalLaw, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1321, 1345 (2007) ("'A jury should represent a cross-section
drawn at random from the community, and should be the means of bringing to bear on the issues the
corporate good sense of that community."') (quoting the 1965 Report of the Departmental Committee on

Jury Service in the United Kingdom); McEldowney, supra note 354, at 282 (arguing that the need for
representative juries increases "[a]s English society becomes more heterogeneous").
316 See Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 118(1) (Eng. & Wales). The Criminal Justice Act of
1988 took effect on January 5, 1989. Id
31 CHERYL THOMAS, ARE JURIES FAIR? i-ii, 45 (2010), https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/
publications/research-and-analysis/moj-researchlare-juries-fair-research.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7X6S-

5AYC].
. Nancy S. Marder, Two Weeks at the Old Bailey: Jury Lessons from England, 86 CHI.-KENT L.

REV. 537, 552-53 (2011).
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Supreme Court justice or two to jump-start a public conversation." 359 She
had initially raised the question whether Foster "[m]ight ... provide such
an occasion." 360 Although the Court missed the opportunity to take up that
question in Foster, there will be other opportunities and the question remains
germane.
Justice Marshall began this public conversation thirty years ago in his
concurrence in Batson and other Justices and judges have since joined
him."' On the Supreme Court, Justice Breyer observed that "a jury system
without peremptories is no longer unthinkable."3 62 He invited his colleagues
to reconsider whether peremptories should be eliminated in order to
eliminate discrimination during jury selection. In his concurrence in MillerEl v. Dretke, he wrote: "This case suggests the need to confront that
choice." 363 He ended his concurrence by suggesting that it is "necessary to
reconsider Batson's test and the peremptory challenge system as a whole.""3 6
Justice Stevens, while he was still on the Court, began to consider whether
peremptories should be eliminated. 365 As a trial lawyer, he had viewed them
as "an inalienable right," but as a judge, he began to see that they "produce
minimal benefits at best" and involve "significant cost[s]." 3 6 6 This led him
to observe: "A citizen should not be denied the opportunity to serve as a
juror unless an impartial judge can state an acceptable reason for the denial.
A challenge for cause provides such a reason; a peremptory challenge does
not."3 67 Justice Kennedy broached the question indirectly when he noted in
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.3 68 that "if race stereotypes are the price
for acceptance of a jury panel as fair, the price is too high to meet the
standard of the Constitution."3 69
Trial judges, who are in the trenches, have begun to question the practice
of peremptory challenges, and a few even banished them from their own
courtrooms. Judge Constance Baker Motley, when she was a federal district
court judge in the Southern District of New York, took seriously Justice
35 Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court's Gap on Race and Juries, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/06/opinion/the-supreme-courts-gap-on-race-and-juries.html?smpr

[https://perma.cc/TYR7-FMY7].
360 Id
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 233 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); see Rice v. Collins, 546
U.S. 333, 344 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("I have argued that legal life without peremptories is no
361
362

longer unthinkable .... I continue to believe that we should reconsider Batson's test and the peremptory
challenge system as a whole.").

6 Dretke, 545 U.S. at 273.
363
366

367
368
369

E.g., John Paul Stevens, Foreword, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 907 (2003).
Id.
Id. at 907-08.
500 U.S. 614 (1991).
Id at 630.
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Marshall's admonition that discrimination during jury selection could not be
eliminated unless peremptories were eliminated.370 In Minetos v. City
University of New York, she held that peremptory challenges were a per se
violation of the Equal Protection Clause and banned them in her
courtroom.3 71 In addition to Judge Motley, Judge Evelyn Clay, a Cook

County Circuit Court Judge, declared in several trials her unwillingness to
seat an all-white jury.372 She moved ahead of Batson in her own courtroom.
She explained that she thought an all-white jury denied the defendant a jury
of his peers and that the government needed to be willing to seat qualified
African-American jurors on the jury. 3 73
A number of trial judges, while not going as far as Judge Motley's ban
or Judge Clay's interpretation of the law, have nonetheless expressed the
view that peremptory challenges should be eliminated. Judge Raymond
Broderick, when he was a senior federal district court judge in Pennsylvania,
wrote an early article entitled Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be
Abolished.3 74 More recently, Judge Mark Bennett, a federal district court
judge in the Northern District of Iowa, joined "Justice Marshall and Justice
Breyer's call for banning peremptories entirely as the only means to
eliminate lawyers' tendency to strike jurors due to stereotype and bias."3 75
Several state court judges have long taken the view that peremptory
challenges should be eliminated. Judge Morris Hoffman, a state court judge
in Colorado, was one of the first to come out against peremptory
challenges.376 He was joined by Judge Gregory Mize, now a senior Superior
Court judge in Washington, D.C., who also spoke out against them,37 7 as did
Judge Arthur Burnett. Judge Burnett, now a senior judge on the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia, wrote that "peremptory challenges could

no Minetos v. City Univ. of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 177, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Over twenty years ago,
Judge Constance Baker Motley wrote that "[t]ime has proven Mr. Justice Marshall correct." Id.
371

Id. at 185. Admittedly, Judge Motley had already taken senior status when she held that

peremptories were a per se violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
372 See Jeff Coen, Judge Lays Down Own Law: No All-White Juries: Transcripts Reveal

Controversial Stand, CHI. TRIB.

(July 25,

2005),

http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-07-

25/news/0507250165 1 all-white-jury-number-of-peremptory-challenges-transcripts [https://perma.cc/

KY87-VXFL].
37

Id

Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory ChallengeShould Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV.
369, 420 (1992).
374

3n Bennett, supranote 291, at 167.

See Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should be Abolished: A Trial Judge's
Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 810, 850 (1997).
371

1

See Gregory E. Mize, On Better Jury Selection: Spotting UFO Jurors Before They Enter the

Jury Room, CT. REV., Spring 1999, at 10 ("[U]rg[ing] greater reliance on reason-based, for-cause
elimination of biased jurors, rather than on the inherently irrational use of peremptory challenges.").
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and should be abolished altogether."3 78 Judge Bellacosa, on the Court of
Appeals in New York, filed a concurring opinion, joined by Chief Judge
Wachtler and Judge Titone, in which he called for the elimination of
peremptory challenges because they "have outlived their usefulness and,
ironically, appear to be disguising discrimination-not minimizing it, and
clearly not eliminating it."379 He urged the U.S. Supreme Court and the state
legislature to take action.3"o In Commonwealth v. Rodriguez,38 ' and earlier
in Commonwealth v. Maldonado,382 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Chief Justice Margaret H. Marshall also "call[ed] for peremptory challenges
to be abolished or restricted substantially."3 83
What is significant is that these trial judges, whether in federal or state
courts, have presided over numerous jury trials, are familiar with how
peremptory challenges work in practice, and have concluded that
peremptory challenges should be eliminated. As Judge Hoffman explained:
"[W]e see a lot of trials-many more than even the busiest trial lawyer." 384
Their view is entitled to great weight because they are the ones who have
had to put Batson into effect.385 They have occupied a ringside seat from
which to observe Batson's deficiencies, and they have concluded that jury
selection can work well without peremptory challenges. Indeed, their
conclusion goes one step further-it is only with the elimination of
peremptory challenges that jury selection can work so that prospective jurors
can be seated without regard to race, gender, or ethnicity.
3. Addressing Lawyers'Resistance
Most trial lawyers continue to view peremptory challenges as an
n. Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., Abolish Peremptory Challenges: Reform Juries to Promote Impartiality,

CRIM. JUST., Fall 2005, at 26, 27.
..People v. Boiling, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (N.Y. 1992) (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
380 See id. at 1142-43, 1146.
3 See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 931 N.E.2d 20, 43 (Mass. 2010) (Marshall, C.J., concurring)
(writing separately to address peremptory challenges and arguing "it is time either to abolish them
entirely, or to restrict their use substantially"). Justice Francis X. Spina joined Chief Justice Marshall in
her concurrence. See id.

See Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 788 N.E.2d 968, 975 (Mass. 2003) (Marshall, C.J.,

382

concurring). Justice Francis X. Spina and now-retired Justice John M. Greaney joined Chief Justice
Marshall's concurrence. See id.
3
Phillip Bantz, Is It Time for Peremptory Challenges in Mass. to Go?, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Aug.

23, 2010.
384

Morris B. Hoffiman, Peremptory Challenges: Lawyers Are from Mars, Judges Are from Venus,

3 GREEN BAG 2d 135, 136 (2000); see id. ("When I am on the civil bench I try an average of 15 to 20
jury trials each year. On the criminal bench I try 25 to 30 jury trials each year. That's a lot of trials, and

a lot of peremptory challenge questions . . . .").
38. Chief Justice Burger, writing in dissent in Batson, noted that trial judges faced a difficult task;
they were the ones who had "to find their way through the morass the Court creates today." Batson v.

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 131 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). He chastised the Court for leaving the trial
judges bereft of any guidance. Id.
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"inalienable right," just as Justice Stevens had when he was a trial lawyer.38 6
It might be because the peremptory challenge gives lawyers a sense of
control over whom the jurors will be and allows them to remove those about
whom they have misgivings even if they cannot articulate why. They might
also believe that they can spot unreliable prospective jurors, or "UFO jurors"
in Judge Mize's words, whom the judge will still permit on the jury because
they do not meet the for cause standard for removal.3 87 It might also be
because they think that peremptories operate to their strategic advantage and
they do not want to relinquish that advantage. Or it might simply be that
peremptories have always been part of American jury trials and that they are
familiar with them and are reticent to experiment with change. Their view
of peremptories might well be: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it."
When lawyers have advocated for changes to improve the jury system,
they have usually urged that peremptory challenges remain as they are.
When the American Bar Association (ABA) issued its Principlesfor Juries
and Jury Trials, it recommended maintaining the peremptory challenge. 8 8
Principle 11 .D simply states that "[p]eremptory challenges should be
available to each of the parties."389 Similarly, when Arizona's jury reform
committee issued a report containing fifty-five ways to reform the jury, it
maintained the peremptory challenge as is.3 90
Although trial lawyers are typically staunch defenders of the peremptory
challenge, some have recognized that while lawyers believe they use the
peremptory to their advantage, there is little evidence that they do. As Alan
Dershowitz, a law professor and trial lawyer, has recognized: "Lawyers'
instincts are often the least trustworthy basis on which to pick jurors. All
those neat rules of thumb, but no feedback. Ten years of accumulated
experiences may be 10 years of being wrong." 9 ' Trial lawyers might believe
386 Stevens, supra note 365, at 907.

387 Mize, supra note 377, at 10. Judge Mize explained that such "UFO jurors" can be more readily

identified if the judge conducts an individual voir dire after conducting a general group voir dire. Id at
11-12. An individual voir dire ensures that prospective jurors must respond to questions and cannot
remain silent even when questions pertain to them, as they are wont to do during the group voir dire. Id.
388 See AM. BAR* ASS'N, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES & JURY TRIALS 13-14 (2005),

http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/abajprinciples for juries and jurytrials 2005.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FRE7-XMD6].
389 Id
390

See ARIz. SUP. CT. COMM. ON MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF JURIES, JURORS: THE POWER OF 12, at
68-71 (1994); see also William H. Carlile,Arizona Jury Reforms Buck Legal Traditions, CHRISTIAN SCI.

MONITOR (Feb. 22, 1996), http://www.csmonitor.com/1996/0222/22011l.html [https://perma.cc/KM6PMUPL] (noting that Arizona had adopted eighteen of the jury reform committee's fifty-five
recommendations).
391
Morton Hunt, Putting Juries on the Couch, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28,
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/28/magazine/putting-juries-on-the-couch.html?pagewanted=all

[https://perma.cc/7H4W-N3TQ] (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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that they can discern bias and discover which jurors will be sympathetic to
their case, and might believe that this is one of the strengths that they bring
to their client's case, but there is little empirical evidence that they can do
this. In fact, the evidence suggests that they usually cannot do this. In one
mock jury study, for example, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges
chose to excuse jurors who "were no more or no less likely to convict than
those who were acceptable to judges and defense attorneys."3 92 In another
study, researchers found that trial lawyers relied on certain characteristics to
decide which jurors might be biased, but that their use of those
characteristics was no more sophisticated than the reasoning used by college
sophomores when asked to select jurors.3 93
The tools that trial attorneys have at their disposal to help them decide
which jurors to remove with peremptories are limited, so it is not surprising
that they have difficulty discerning bias. Voir dire is not well designed to
identify bias for a number of reasons: the questioning of prospective jurors
takes place in public; 394 they are questioned as a group; 395 the questions are
typically asked by the judge rather than the lawyer, at least in federal
court;3 9 6 there is pressure on prospective jurors to give socially acceptable
responses; 3 97 and prospective jurors are asked to decide for themselves
whether they think they can be impartial, which is difficult for most people
to do. 398 Although lawyers believe that they can discern bias, it is unlikely
that they can, particularly given the way that voir dire is currently
designed.399
Lawyers might fear that without peremptory challenges they will run the
392

Norbert L. Kerr, The Effects ofPretrialPublicity on Jurors,78 JUDICATURE 120, 126 (1994).
3 Paul V. Olczak et al., Attorneys' Lay Psychologyand its Effectiveness in SelectingJurors: Three

EmpiricalStudies, 6 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 431, 442 (1991).
394 See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid BaldMen and Peoplewith Green Socks? Other
Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78 CHfl.-KENT L. REV. 1179, 1198 (2003)
(recommending more frequent use of written questionnaires that elicit information more privately than
in open court).
'9s See, e.g., Mize, supra note 377, at 11-12 (recommending an individual voir dire in addition to
group voir dire to obtain "more full and candid responses" from prospective jurors).
"'See, e.g., Bennett, supranote 291, at 151 (recommending greater "lawyer participation in voir
dire, thereby placing the primary onus to detect and address the implicit bias ofjurors in the hands of the

trial participants best equipped to do so").
.. See, e.g., Neil Vidmar, When All of Us Are Victims: JurorPrejudiceand "Terrorist"Trials, 78

CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1143, 1150 (2003) ("Some prospective jurors who hold biases are likely to state that
they can be impartial solely because that answer is consistent with socially learned values that people

should be impartial, a phenomenon that psychologists call 'socially desirable' responses.").
" See, e.g., Regina Schuller & Neil Vidmar, The Canadian CriminalJury, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
497, 522 (2011) ("[P]eople may be unaware of existing biases and often maintain that they are personally
fair and egalitarian, with research demonstrating that, while many people do not believe that they
themselves are biased against Blacks, there is strong empirical evidence to suggest otherwise.") (internal
citation omitted).
399

See, e.g., Hans & Jehle, supra note 394, at 1194-97, 1201 (describing the "features of limited

voir dire [that] encourage a lack of candor"); Marder, supranote 352, at 936.
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risk of having biased jurors on a jury, but what they need to realize is that
the jury process educates jurors so that they take their role seriously and try
hard to decide the case based on the evidence presented in court. Every step
of the jury process-from the jury summons to the jury verdict-provides
the court with opportunities to educate jurors as to their proper role. I have
described this in other writing as the need to take "a process view of a juror's
education."400 In other words, every judge-jury or court-jury interaction,
including the summons, the orientation video, the voir dire, the oath, the jury
instructions, and even juror questions, provides an opportunity for the court
to educate jurors as to their proper role. This education of a juror, which
continues throughout the trial, and which jurors take seriously, enables them
to perform their role responsibly and impartially. Although the peremptory
challenge might reassure lawyers that they can discern bias and remove
partial jurors from their juries, that reassurance is misplaced. Instead,
lawyers need to recognize that the trial process educates jurors to perform
their role as ably and impartially as possible.
4. The Supreme Court's Role
a. In Practice
Given lawyers' commitment to peremptory challenges and many trial
judges' acquiescence,4 01 peremptory challenges will not be eliminated
unless the Supreme Court takes the initiative. Thirty years of experience
with Batson40 2 has shown that Batson is not up to the task for which it was
designed. Discriminatory peremptories are still prevalent. Justice White,
writing a concurrence in Batson, explained that he was joining the Court's
opinion, even though he had authored Swain,403 because he recognized that
after twenty years of Swain, "the practice of peremptorily eliminating blacks
from petit juries in cases with black defendants remains widespread." 40
Thirty years have now elapsed since Batson, and the Court should follow
Justice White's lead.
Peremptory challenges preserve a system of jury selection that permits
discrimination. In Batson, the Court held that discriminatory peremptories

n Nancy S. Marder, Jurorsand Social Media: Is a FairTrial Still Possible?, 67 SMU L. REV. 617,
649 (2014); see generally id. at 649-61 (describing the process view of a juror's education); Marder,
Batson Revisited, supra note 9, at 1601-06 (describing aprocess theory ofeducating jurors to be impartial
decision-makers).
4

See Hoffman, supra note 384, at 140 (describing lawyers' commitment to peremptory challenges

and some judges' and academics' openness to the elimination of peremptory challenges).
' Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
0 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203 (1965).
4 Batson, 476 U.S. at 101 (White, J., concurring).

A MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR BATSON AND THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

2017]

1201

'

are a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.405 The Court had hoped that
the three-step test in Batson would permit peremptories to continue while
putting a halt to discriminatory peremptories;4 06 however, discriminatory
peremptories persist. After thirty years of experimentation with Batson, it is
time for the Court to provide a remedy that is adequate to the task. Justice
Marshall recognized the need to eliminate peremptory challenges thirty
years ago, 4 07 and it has resonated more recently with several Justices,
including Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy.4 08 It has also resonated with
a number of lower court judges, who have come to agree with Judge Motley
that "[t]ime has proven Mr. Justice Marshall correct." 409 Justice Marshall
recognized that "only by banning peremptories entirely can such
discrimination be ended." 4 10 It is time to follow Justice Marshall's lead and
to provide an adequate remedy for this constitutional wrong.41
If there are not enough Justices who are ready to eliminate peremptory
challenges, those who are ready can play a vital role by signaling their
readiness in the next Batson case. Thirty-three years ago, Justice Stevens
wrote a brief opinion "respecting the denial of the petitions for writs of
certiorari" in McCray v. New York.4 12 In their petitions in McCray, several
criminal defendants claimed that the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory
challenges to exclude African Americans from their petit juries violated their
right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community,

4 Id at 89. 1 continue to believe that discriminatory peremptories are also a violation of the Sixth
Amendment's right to an impartial jury. Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and

the Roles ofthe Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1125-36 (1995). 1 am not alone in this view. See, e.g., Susan
N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement,Colorblindness, and the Jury,

67 TUL. L. REV. 1807, 1840 (1993); Toni M. Massaro, Peremptoriesor Peers?-Rethinking Sixth
Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 541-60 (1986); Eric L. Muller,
Solving the Batson Paradox:HarmlessError, JuryRepresentation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE

L.J. 93, 96-97, 137-48 (1996); Tetlow, supra note 9, at 1864-65. However, the Court foreclosed this
approach in Hollandv. Illinois and has never looked back. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474,487 (1990).
Instead, it has developed a long line of cases in which discriminatory peremptory challenges are a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See supranotes 4-7 (identifying the Batson progeny).
46 Batson, 476 U.S. at 99.

4 Id at 102-03.
* See supranotes 362-64, 368-69.
4
Minetos v. City Univ. of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 177, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see, e.g., Ray-Simmons
v. State, 132 A.3d 275, 290 (Md. 2016) (McDonald, J., dissenting) ("In Batson itself, Justice Thurgood
Marshall suggested in a concurring opinion that ending discrimination in peremptory strikes would be

best achieved by abolishing peremptory strikes altogether. Others have come to the same conclusion.").
410 Batson, 476 U.S. at 108.
411 Although the Supreme Court can declare that peremptory challenges are unconstitutional
because they permit discrimination during jury selection and thus violate the Equal Protection Clause, it
would remain for states, Congress, and the federal rules advisory committees to make the necessary
revisions to put this change into effect because the number of peremptory challenges that parties have
are usually provided by statute and/or rule.
412

461 U.S. 961 (1983).
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as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.4 13
In his brief opinion, Justice Stevens explained why he voted to deny the
petitions. Even though he thought the issue was important, he thought it wise
to let the issue percolate further in the lower courts.414 Justices Harry A.
Blackmun and Lewis F. Powell, Jr. joined Justice Stevens' opinion, and
Justices Thurgood Marshall and William J. Brennan, Jr. dissented from the
Court's denial of the petitions for writs of certiorari. 4 15Justice Stevens'
opinion, joined by two other Justices, plus the two dissenters, signaled to
potential petitioners that five Justices thought the issue was an important one
that the Court should ultimately hear. 4 16 The opinion also signaled to lower
court judges that Swain was not written in stone.4 17 The Justices need to make
clear that Batson is open to question, just as Justice Stevens had signaled in
McCray, and that peremptories are open to challenge, even if the time has
not yet come.
b. As Inspiration
Whether it is now or sometime very soon, the Supreme Court needs to
eliminate peremptory challenges because of the enduring role that the jury
plays in American society and the inspiring role that the American jury plays
in other countries, particularly in aspiring democracies. The American jury,
as Alexis de Tocqueville observed 180 years ago, serves as a "free
school." 418 It teaches citizens to participate in self-governance, which is
important in a democracy. It also brings together citizens from all walks of
life and has them work on the critical task of resolving disputes in their
society. In polls, citizens who have served as jurors usually think highly of
the jury and conclude that the jury performed its job responsibly.4 19 Some
studies suggest that citizens who serve on juries go on to perform other acts
of citizenship, such as voting in elections.420 It is essential that those who
413 Id. at 966-67 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
414

Id at 963-64.

41s Id. at 961.
416 Carol Lee, Reminiscences ofJustice Stevens by His Law Clerks: Three Memorable
Opinions, 94

JUDICATURE 9, 10 (2010).
417 E-mail from Carol Lee, Gen. Counsel, Taconic Capital
Advisors L.P., to Nancy S. Marder,

Professor of Law, LIT Chicago-Kent Coll. of Law (Sept. 21, 2015, 2:49 PM) (on file with author).
4" ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 275 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George Lawrence

trans., 1969) (1835).
419 See, e.g., New Poll Shows Strong Supportfor Jury System; Incoming ABA President Calls on

Americans

to

Act

on

Their

Beliefs,

AM.

B.

Ass'N

(Aug.

9,

2004),

https://americanbarassociation.wordpress.com/2004/08/09/new-poll-shows-strong-support-for-jury-

system-incoming-aba-president-calls-on-americans-to-act-on-their-beliefs/
NT8C] (describing the ABA's survey on the jury).

[https://perma.cc/L638-

420 See, e.g., JOHN GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION
PROMOTES CIvIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 48-49 (2010) (finding that criminal jury
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answer their jury summons and go to the courthouse do not encounter
discrimination that keeps them from being seated on a jury. It is also
essential that jury selection is not marred by discriminatory peremptories so
that the parties and the community will respect the jury trial and accept the
verdict even if they do not agree with it. Tocqueville recognized that the
American jury functions as more than "simply ... a judicial institution."42 1
In fact, for Tocqueville that was "the least important aspect of the matter."4 22
Rather, the jury serves "above all, [as] a political institution" and "it is from
that point of view that [the American jury] must always be judged."4 23 The
jury is a political institution not only because it teaches self-governance, but
also because it raises ordinary citizens "to 'the judges' bench.' 4 24 Juries,
along with judges, constitute one of the three branches of government and
serve as a check on the other two branches. When any part of thejury process
is tainted by discrimination, it threatens more than the legitimacy of the
verdict; it threatens to undermine the integrity of the judiciary.
The American jury serves as a political institution not just in the United
States, but in other countries as well. Many countries have adopted jury
systems or mixed courts that involve lay participation.42 5 The American jury
serves as a model for countries looking to have citizens play a greater role
in their judicial system.426 Justice Breyer described the value of exchanges
an open
among judges from different countries as follows: "There is ...
invitation for each judge to consider his or her own system in light of others.
The result is a broadening of vision."427 The same is true for the jury. Some
countries, such as Spain, adopted the traditional jury system in criminal
cases.4 28 Other countries, such as Korea and Japan, have chosen to have

trial service increased voting among low-frequency voters); Valerie P. Hans et al., Deliberative
Democracy and the American Civil Jury, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 697, 712 (2014) (finding that
civil jury trial service increased voting, depending on jury size, unanimity rule, defendant identity, and

case type).
421 TOCQUEVILLE, supranote 418, at 272.
422

d. at 273.
Id. at 272.
Id. at 272-73.

1

423
424

425 See Symposium on Comparative Jury Systems, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 449 (2011) (providing
examples ofjury systems in Australia, Canada, England and Wales, Spain, and Russia, and mixed courts

in France).
426 Of course, it is a two-way street. The American jury can benefit from some practices that work
well in other countries. See Marder, supranote 358, at 539 ("Jury practices in another country can suggest
new ways to conduct jury trials in one's own country."); see also id. at 539-51 (describing other jury
practices in England and Wales that would work well in the United States).
427 STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL

REALITIES 270 (2015).
428 See, e.g., Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, Jury Selection and Jury Trial in Spain: Between Theory and

Practice, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 585, 600-02 (2011) (explaining that Spain adopted a traditional jury
system, but its juries are required to give reasons for their verdicts); Stephen C. Thaman, Should Criminal
Juries Give Reasonsfor Their Verdicts?: The Spanish Experience and the Implications of the European
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citizens work with professional judges, to decide certain criminal cases, so
that judges or prosecutors do not lose touch with ordinary citizens' views. 4 2 9
Other countries, such as Russia, have returned to a traditional jury system,

but still struggle to establish a jury that operates independently. 430 For
countries that have adopted the traditional jury, and even for countries that
have chosen a hybrid system of judges and lay participants, the American
jury serves as a model. It is important that American jury selection is free
from discrimination so that our own jury system has integrity and so that it
can inspire other countries, especially those still struggling to establish
democracies with an independent judiciary and jury.
CONCLUSION
Jury selection in Timothy Tyrone Foster's trial was marred by the
prosecutors' use of discriminatory peremptory challenges. Although the
prosecutors gave seemingly race-neutral reasons for their exercise of four
peremptory challenges against four African-American prospective jurors,
the prosecutors' notes revealed that their peremptories were motivated by

race. The Supreme Court refused to turn a blind eye to the prosecutors'
notes; instead, the notes led the Court to examine the prosecutors' reasons
with great care. The Court found that the prosecutors had exercised at least
two peremptory challenges in violation of Batson v. Kentucky.
We have now had thirty years of the Batson experiment. There is ample
evidence that Batson, though well intentioned, has failed to rid jury selection
of discriminatory peremptories. Although the Court could consider other
alternatives, such as permitting parties to infer discriminatory intent by
showing discriminatory effects or discriminatory practices, or by providing
more stringent remedies, such as the one followed in North Carolina, in
order to deter prosecutors from engaging in discriminatory peremptory
challenges in capital cases, in the end these approaches are unlikely to
provide an adequate remedy.
Court of Human Rights Decision in Taxquet v. Belgium, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 613, 628 (2011)
(describing Spain's revival of the "classic jury").

429 See, e.g., Hiroshi Fukurai, The Rebirth ofJapan'sPetitQuasi-Juryand Grand JurySystems: A
Cross-NationalAnalysis ofLegal Consciousnessand the Lay ParticipatoryExperience in Japanandthe
U.S., 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 315, 328-29 (2007) (describing how public participation in criminal

proceedings may serve as a check on prosecutorial decisions not to prosecute alleged misconduct by
public officers or political groups); Jae-Hyup Lee, Getting Citizens Involved: Civil Participationin
JudicialDecision-Makingin Korea, 4 E. ASIA L. REV. 177, 183 (2009) (discussing Korea's introduction
of the jury system due to public "[c]oncem over professional judges' dogmatic judgment and their
monopoly on fact-finding").
30 See Stephen C. Thaman, The Good, the Bad, or the Indiferent: 12 Angry Men in Russia, 82
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 791, 808 (2007) (citing a poll in Russia in which "[f]ifty-one percent [of respondents]
thought it was tough for juries to be objective in today's conditions, and that it was 'easy to buy or scare'
jurors.").
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Eventually, the Court will have to recognize that discriminatory
peremptories persist and that the only adequate remedy is the elimination of
peremptory challenges. Many lawyers and some judges may balk at the loss
of a tradition, but it is a tradition that serves as a mask for discrimination and
for that reason it is a tradition that we should discard. In its place would be
a new tradition: jury selection without the cover for discrimination that
peremptory challenges now provide.
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